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INTRODUCTION
In the areas of health and safety regulation, environmental protection, and
consumer protection, the states often fill in for federal regulators through the
use of traditional state common-law doctrines, like negligence or nuisance, or
their own consumer protection statutes. Often, state laws echo the correspond-
ing federal laws and can be enforced by state attorneys general and private citi-
zens. However, over the past decade, federal agencies have aggressively
preempted concurrent enforcement of state statutes and regulations,' and
sometimes state common law as well.' This preemption creates a vast unregu-
lated domain when federal agencies do not enforce their regulations. If, as Pro-
1. Elizabeth Cabraser, Due Process Preempted: Stealth Preemption as a Consequence of
Agency Capture, 65 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 449 (2010) (providing a case study of the
Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) preemption preamble and subsequent
overruling by the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)); Nina
A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 695,
699 (20o8) (describing agency preemption by preamble and arguing that the
Court should employ a presumption against this particular type of preemption);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federali-
zation of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227, 229 (2007) (discussing the recent phe-
nomenon of agencies' declaring preemption in preambles and noting that, "[alt
the extreme, a disconcerting scenario emerges, whereby aggressive regulatory
preemption, combined with a renewed vigor for eviscerating federal private caus-
es of action, could lead to a nearly complete substitution of public for private en-
forcement of the law").
2. Sharkey, supra note 1, at 232-33 (discussing the Consumer Product Safety Com-
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fessor Gillian Metzger claims, administrative law is the new federalism, 3 it ap-
pears to be a federalism strongly weighted in favor of the federal government.
Agency inaction, an understudied problem, is mostly immune to judicial
review.4 Through inaction, an agency can neglect its public-interest mandate.'
The doctrine of nonreviewability governs which claims a court may hear, while
the doctrine of standing governs which parties may bring suit. Both doctrines
are used to bar judicial review of agency inaction.6 Where a state is given au-
thority to bring an enforcement action under federal law, however, the issue of
judicial review of agency inaction does not arise.7 Instead, the relevant policy
concerns relate to federalism: Specifically, does harnessing the power of the
states to aid, but also check, federal agencies result in more equitable enforce-
ment and advance the agencies' public-interest mandate?
One approach to restoring the federalism balance (i.e., the balance between
the federal and state governments) in administrative law is to employ a web of
mechanisms that promote regulatory enforcement. Such a strategy would em-
ploy federal legislation that: (i) operates as a floor to state regulation (with little
or no preemption of stricter state regulation);' (2) grants a private right of ac-
tion;9 and (3) grants state attorneys general the power to enforce federal regula-
3. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023
(2008).
4. For more on the doctrine of judicial review of agency inaction, see infra Section
I.A.
5. Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Fed-
eral Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 8 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (finding that
environmental groups may not challenge the Bureau of Land Management's deci-
sion not to manage off-road vehicles in federal lands); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that environmental organizations lacked
standing to challenge administrative regulations relating to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act).
7. Thus, with concurrent state enforcement there is less of the concern stated by the
Supreme Court in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, which explained
the Court's reluctance to review cases of agency inaction because of a need "to
protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their lawful discretion, and
to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack
both expertise and information to resolve." Norton, 542 U.S. at 66.
8. See William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism's
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY
OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., zoog) (analyzing the
implications of preemption choices for regulatory regimes and concluding that
limited floor preemption allows for maximum innovation and state and citizen
involvement).
9. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal Sys-
tem: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?. 54 Mo. L. REV. 1552, 1651-55 (1995)
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tions. Such a web approach is modeled after some original pollution-control
statutes."o The web synthesizes tort and administrative law and realizes the fede-
ralism benefits of encouraging innovation, investigation, and dynamic regula-
tion. While preemption and private rights of action have received much scho-
larly attention, there has been little analysis of the importance of concurrent
state enforcement of federal law."
I want to make sure that this Article does not overstate the effectiveness of a
concurrent state enforcement power. States already play other roles in enforce-
ment through state agencies funded with federal money" or through their own
statutes and political processes." The state enforcement power is most effective
(examining the particular role of the citizen suit in closing a governmental en-
forcement gap).
10. See id. at 1555-56 (discussing the web approach of the Clean Water Act); see also
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (arguing for the need to blend both public and private
rights in order to maximize enforcement of agency regulations, focusing on the
importance of judicially created private rights of enforcement). However, even in
environmental enforcement, limitations remain. See, e.g., California v. U.S. Dep't
of the Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9 th Cir. 1988) (holding that state authorities may not
enforce civil penalties against the federal government for violation of the Clean
Water Act).
11. For an excellent discussion of the use of private rights of action to enforce federal
regulations, see Stewart & Sunstein, supra note io. See also Hodas, supra note 9
(arguing that citizen suits are a critical supplement to federal and state enforce-
ment of environmental laws). For a discussion of regulatory capture in the envi-
ronmental arena under the Reagan administration, and subsequent analysis of the
role of citizen suits in combating it, see Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985).
12. Many of the environmental statutes, for example, allow the states to implement
the federal environmental laws through state-run agencies that are then moni-
tored by the federal agency. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); see also William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 1o8, 121-26 (2005) (discussing the "parallel, overlapping, and
cooperative" structure of environmental laws and pointing to state attorney gen-
eral enforcement, along with a significant citizen role, as a particular benefit).
13. A different set of issues arises where state regulatory agencies fall capture to the
same lobbying influences as the federal agencies-a problem recently noted in the
enforcement of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws
Are Neglected, at a Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 2009, at Ai (examining West Virgin-
ia's history underenforcement of the Clean Water Act and its ties to the coal in-
dustry, and finding that "similar problems exist in other states, where critics say
regulators have often turned a blind eye to polluters. Regulators in five other
states, in interviews, said they had been pressured by industry-friendly politicians
to drop continuing pollution investigations"). This problem might be more likely
168
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as part of a regime of several consumer protection mechanisms, including li-
mited or no preemption, and private rights of action. However, the power to
step in for federal agencies and enforce violations of federal regulations in fed-
eral court allows states to aid the agencies and hold them accountable when
they fail to act. 4
Recent expansion of administrative preemption has upset the federalism
balance, making concurrent state enforcement powers more important. 5 This is
not to argue that independent state regulatory authority is secondary, let alone
superfluous; states depend almost exclusively on their statutes and common law
to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.'" This Article merely argues
that recently expanded preemption has highlighted the problem of agency inac-
tion and the inability of states to remedy it. States must not only be granted a
concurrent enforcement power but must also remain free to enact their own
regulations where appropriate."
to arise when a state has incentives to advance its parochial interests-e.g., when a
state under-regulates polluters in its jurisdiction in order to lure more industry
and thus create more jobs for its residents. See Buzbee, supra note 12, at 111-12.
14. Questions about the relationship between federalism and separation-of-powers
doctrines are certainly relevant to state enforcement of federal law, but such ques-
tions are beyond the scope of this Article. Debates about Congress's delegation of
enforcement power to the states first surfaced in the 198os and 1990s but receded
as political shifts prompted Congress to abandon the practice over the past dec-
ade. This Article attempts to revive the practice and to synthesize previous scho-
larly debates with current federalism trends in administrative law. The enforce-
ment provisions examined in this Article contain the requisite executive
supervision-through the notice requirement and the requirement that the state
not bring an action if the agency is already pursuing legal action. Whether this sa-
tisfies separation-of-powers and unitary-executive-theory concerns is a matter of
scholarly debate, but it is worth noting that previous statutes have included a state
enforcement power. For more on separation-of-powers issues, see infra Section
VI.A. See also Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of
Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075 (1997) (exploring the connection between
the unitary executive theory and state administration of federally defined law);
Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62,
80-84 (1990) (conceding that federalism concerns may be enough to trump sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns with congressional delegations of enforcement power
to states).
15. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 2025-26.
16. But cf Henry Butler & Jason Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Lia-
bility: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (arguing that in the
wake of the federal development of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency,
state consumer protection acts are redundant).
17. There are important distinctions between a state's using a concurrent enforce-
ment power to enforce federal regulations in federal court and a state's relying on
its own statutory or common law to enforce its own regulations in its own courts.
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Legal scholarship" has echoed Congress's proposals'9 and language in re-
cent Supreme Court opinions,2 0 suggesting growing support for a more robust
state role in administrative enforcement.21 The question, then, is whether an en-
larged role for state enforcement can help to correct the federalism imbalance
and curb unfettered executive discretion-problems that have recently preoc-
cupied administrative law scholars." This Article attempts a more detailed anal-
ysis of legislatively created state enforcement powers as a response to agency in-
action, and considers how such powers differ from judicially created rights to
access the courts.
While states have frequently enforced federal antitrust and environmental
laws," this Article instead focuses on consumer protection law for four reasons.
For the great majority of fraudulent or otherwise harmful consumer practices, a
state will rely on its own laws in its own courts. Granting concurrent enforcement
power to strengthen federal agency enforcement increases the accountability of
federal agencies, but does not address state independence and innovation. In or-
der to achieve maximum accountability, the states should retain their autonom-
ous regulatory authority along with a concurrent enforcement power.
18. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 2029 (suggesting "that the Court should employ ad-
ministrative law with an eye to reinforcing agencies' sensitivity and responsiveness
to state interests"); Sharkey, supra note i, at 229 ("[A)gencies might emerge as ef-
fective representatives of state interests, the situs for a rich, deliberative dialogue
regarding the interplay of state law and federal regulatory schemes.").
19. See infra Section V.B.
20. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) ("Given ... Massachu-
setts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is en-
titled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.").
21. Recent legislation and debates have renewed focus on language expressly granting
state attorneys general the right to bring enforcement suits. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. m-203, § 1042, 124
Stat. 1376, 2012 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552); Consumer Product Safe-
ty Improvement Act of 2oo8, 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (Supp. 11 2009). Similar en-
forcement language has also been discussed in recent proposed climate change
legislation. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-
Markey), H.R. 2454, ith Cong. (2009).
22. Metzger, supra note 3, at 2029; see also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massa-
chusetts v. EPA- From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 54 ("In a broader
perspective, MA v EPA can be seen, along with Gonzales and Hamdan, as one in a
series of rebukes to the administration, an expression of the Court's growing con-
cern about potential executive overreaching. Viewed in this light, political interfe-
rence with agency decision making is a species of a larger problem. Our main sug-
gestion for administrative law, then, is that MA v EPA is part of a trend in which
the Court has at least temporarily become disenchanted with executive power and
the idea of political accountability and is now concerned to protect administrative
expertise from political intrusion.").
23. Statutory grants of enforcement were first seen in the 1970s, principally in envi-
ronmental and antitrust laws. See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
170
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First, consumer protection agencies have arguably fallen prey to egregious polit-
ical capture over the past decade, prompting a series of congressional over-
hauls.? Second, these agencies have mounted an aggressive preemption cam-
paign." Third, the media have devoted considerable attention to consumer
protection issues, giving the states a potent weapon that helps to offset practical
limitations such as small state staffs and budgets." Fourth, consumer protection
falls within the traditional state common-law realms of health and safety. Like
environmental protection, products liability originated in tort and has become
more regulatory-a transformation that explains much of the federal-state reg-
ulatory overlap in the environmental arena." However, unlike environmental
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Clean Air Act, ch.
360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
These grants are structured as part of a complex cooperative federalism statutory
regime. While this structure is informative to a discussion of federalism in admin-
istrative law, the focus of this Article is areas where state enforcement is carved
out of a mostly federal statutory regime. Such a structure can create the federal-
state tension distinctive of "uncooperative federalism." See infra Section I.B.
24. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory
Metrics, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (2008).
25. See Sharkey, supra note i, at 227, 229-42. In addition, this preemption campaign
led to a Senate hearing on preemption. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal
Agencies Usurping Congressional and State Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, noth Cong. 2-3 (2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
26. For more on the role of the media in consumer protection, see infra Part III,
which examines state enforcement actions and their relationship to the media.
27. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Cli-
mate Change Efforts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1656 (2008) ("The use of statutory
and regulatory standards to create duties of care for purposes of negligence per se
is an early, obvious example of how the regulatory state influences tort law. Other
examples include the recent tort reform movement for statutory caps on certain
types of damages and legislative efforts to create regulatory compliance defenses
to common law tort claims."); see also JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS, at xix, 33, 325, 1020 (2004) (noting that modern
tort law operates in an increasingly complex statutory and regulatory environ-
ment). The federal-state regulatory overlap leads to a tension that has to do with
the collective nature of the benefits at issue-that is, cleaner air, safer products,
and a safer food supply all have collective benefits, and it is difficult to quantify
each person's individual share. The beneficiaries of such goods tend to be less or-
ganized and may encounter more barriers to challenging threats to these goods in
court.
Environmental regulation in particular has seen significant experimentation
with federal-state regulatory balancing. While many of the pollution control sta-
tutes contain a version of the "public interest triangle," environmental laws also
171
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statutory structures, the state and federal consumer protection laws remain in-
dependent of each other."s For this reason, the state enforcement power takes
on an element of oversight, or accountability forcing. A state power to enforce
federal regulations may work best in the realms of health and safety and con-
sumer protection because of the state's traditional role in these areas.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of state enforcement of federal ad-
ministrative law and traditional doctrines governing judicial review of agency
inaction. Part II examines the recent history of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) as a case study of these larger institutional patterns: the
Agency's apparent capture by industry or an industry-sympathetic executive
branch, the Agency's simultaneous weakened enforcement, and Congress's re-
sponse with the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 20o8 (CPS[A).
Part III examines pre-CPSIA enforcement actions taken by state attorneys gen-
eral and explores how federalism can inform a new framework of administra-
tive law through state enforcement provisions. Part IV evaluates recent Su-
preme Court decisions considering other state mechanisms for challenging
federal agency inaction-namely, an expanded state standing doctrine and a li-
mited preemption doctrine. Part IV also compares the public-law nature of a
state enforcement power to the Court's focus on expanding or protecting pri-
vate-law rights. Part V considers examples of congressional delegations of en-
forcement powers to states aside from the CPSIA. It concludes that Congress is
have complex federal-state implementation mechanisms. See Will Reisinger et al.,
Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts
Allow Citizen Suits To Pick up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'y F. 1, 2 (2010).
For example, in many cases the states are required to design and implement their
own regulations under the federal law, regulations for which they retain primary
enforcement responsibility. Id. at 2 n.6 ("Federal regulations establish national
standards, but individual states (or Indian tribes) may implement their own pro-
grams and gain the primary authority and responsibility to enforce the law. For
example, to date forty-six states have (Clean Water Act) implementation pro-
grams that have been approved by the federal EPA."). The environmental issues
such laws are meant to address are local in nature; that is, issues involving a spe-
cific pollution source located within a state's boundaries. The physicality of pollu-
tion in some ways necessitates such a complex web of federal-state enforcement.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135-36 (2oo5) (discussing the most efficient environmental
roles for federal and state governments). However, many times the federal gov-
ernment retains primary enforcement authority for pollution that is interstate in
nature. Id. While the consumer protection laws discussed in this Article have a lo-
cal element (the placement of defective products on local store shelves), the busi-
ness interests and suppliers of the defective products tend to be national or multi-
national corporations, a fact that obviates state concerns about keeping those
businesses active in the state.
28. For example, while many states have enacted their own bevy of state consumer
protection laws, these state laws and state agencies remain independent of the fed-
eral agencies and laws governing consumer protection.
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increasingly turning to the state enforcement power to counter lax regulatory
oversight and preemption of state consumer protection laws. Part VI explores
the implications of using the states to hold federal agencies accountable and
shows how this approach supplements private-law enforcement mechanisms.
Finally, the Article concludes that state attorneys general play an important role
in revitalizing public trust in federal administrative agencies.
I. THE STATES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the operation of the
many federal agencies. 9 Rulemaking, the process by which agencies create regu-
lations, was at first an afterthought but eventually became a significant form of
agency action. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress began creating agen-
cies with direct rulemaking powers.3" To ensure fairness in the promulgation
and enforcement of regulations, the APA requires notice-and-comment proce-
dures and evidence of reasoned decision making.? Along with deference and
other review doctrines," these are some of the most studied features of adminis-
trative law." Enforcement mechanisms are a less recognized and studied means
29. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The administrative agency system was
the result of a New Deal attempt to create an expert bureaucracy better equipped
to regulate specialized areas, like food and drugs. See George Shepard, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996). But see David Rubenstein, 'Relative Checks': To-
wards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2176
(2010) ("Administrative policy-making is now understood to be as much or more
about politics as it is about expertise and science.").
30. The expansion in agency rulemaking renewed the debate about how much power
these agencies might have to regulate business. Recent executive administrations,
like many business interests since the passage of the APA, recognized the econom-
ic and political power of these agencies. One response was to weaken the agencies
in order to undermine regulation. For example, corporate lobbyists and their
allies started securing agency positions, which they used to weaken safety stan-
dards meant to protect Americans from harm. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Foundations ofAdministrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REv. 117, 147-48 (2006).
31. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (describing the notice-
and-comment procedures required by the Act).
32. For more on the standards of review and deference in administrative law, see Da-
vid Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135-36 (2010), which describes
the six main standards of review of agency action in administrative law.
33. Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12
AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 95, 97 (2010) (explaining that questions about appropriate
standards of judicial review and deference dominate administrative law scholar-
ship).
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of ensuring fairness in administrative procedure. 4 However, all of these doc-
trines are relevant for assessing the balance of power between federal agencies
and states."
This Article will focus on one particular agency, its history and enforcement
record, and Congress's responses to the agency's failures. Congress created the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in 1972 to closely regulate
product safety.3* The CPSC has the authority to set safety standards, require
labeling, order recalls, ban products, collect death and injury data, inform the
public about consumer product safety, and contribute to the process by which
voluntary standards are set. The executive branch nominates commissioners to
run the CPSC17
The executive branch also exerts less formal control over agency action
through the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which reviews agency rules according to a cost-
benefit analysis and for general compliance with the administration's policy
goals. " Such executive control can greatly affect the actions taken, or not taken,
by the agencies.39 Since lobbyists need only focus on one branch-the execu-
tive-in order to undercut regulation, the current configuration is ripe for cap-
ture.40 Recently, under an executive administration particularly favorable to-
34. To the extent that enforcement schemes are examined, the focus tends to be on
supplemental private remedies, like citizen suits. See, e.g., Reisinger et al., supra
note 27,
35. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 2055-62 (examining the implications of administra-
tive law doctrines for federalism).
36. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 4, 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (20o6)).
37. See infra Part II.
38. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). For more on the issues affecting
the consumer protection agencies in regard to this Clinton administration execu-
tive order, which is currently being reevaluated, see Letter from Rena Steinzor,
President, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, to Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget (Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles
PreliminaryCommentsonNewEO-Orszag.pdf.
39. Some studies point to this control as operating to curtail aggressive regulation. See
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MicH. L. REV. 47, 49-50,
75(2o6).
40. Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 'Political' Oversight of Agency Decision-Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) (examining the role of executive politics in agency
rulemaking and proposing more disclosure of this role as a means of enhancing
the legitimacy of agencies).
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ward industry, the CPSC suffered from lack of leadership and inadequate fund-
ing.41
A. States (and Their Citizens) Are Often Powerless When Agencies Fail To
Enforce Their Own Regulations
Sections 701 and 706 of the APA govern agency enforcement. 2 According
to the traditional understanding of these sections, agency decisions not to pros-
ecute are not subject to judicial review.43 Although some forms of inaction, like
the failure to promulgate regulations, are not "presumptively unreviewable,"44
failures to enforce regulations are unreviewable.4 1 Opponents of judicially man-
dated enforcement cite prosecutorial discretion based on limited resources and
the concern that public priorities should not be set by private parties.41 Similar-
ly, some argue that the judicial branch is not competent to compel agency ac-
tion since agency enforcement decisions are based on science and policy, areas
that are better addressed by a politically accountable executive branch. But it is
also problematic to allow agencies to succumb to the political agenda of a cap-
tured executive branch and underenforce their own regulations.
Existing administrative mechanisms afford states some voice in the federal
administrative structure. Federal agencies often depend on states to implement
41. See Hearing of the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs, Ins. & Auto. Safety of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
& Transp., noth Cong. (2007) (statement of Rachel Weintraub, Director of Prod-
uct Safety and Senior Counsel, Consumer Federation of America), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA _TestSenateComrnmerce_32107.pdf (de-
tailing the CPSC's limited budget and resulting enforcement shortcomings).
42. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 701, 706 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (holding that agency fail-
ures to enforce regulations are "presumed immune to judicial review").
44. Id. at 832. Some examples of inaction that have been subject to judicial review are
refusals to initiate rulemaking, see, e.g., Nat'l Customs Brokers v. United States,
883 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d i (D.C. Cir.
1987), and inaction due to claims of lack of jurisdiction, see, e.g., Mont. Air Chap-
ter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1990). Even in these cases of inaction,
however, judicial review is extremely limited and deferential. See, e.g., Norton v. S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
45. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 ("We of course only list the above concerns to facilitate
understanding of our conclusion that an agency's decision not to take enforce-
ment action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2),
For good reasons, such a decision has traditionally been 'committed to agency
discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to
alter that tradition.").
46. This concern is also implicated by citizen suits and other private rights of action.
47. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 2189, 2227.
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agency regulations (through state laws, regulations, or otherwise),48 and states
can provide input during agency rulemaking.49 However, efforts to increase
transparency and consideration of state input in agency rulemaking cannot re-
medy the problem of agency inaction.so And saving clauses, clear statements by
Congress that states may continue to enforce their own laws in conjunction
with a new federal statute, have proved less definitive than their language would
predict.5?
Thus, because of doctrines preventing judicial review, aggressive preemp-
tion of state laws, and ignored saving clauses, states and their citizens are often
powerless when federal agencies do not enforce their own regulations.
B. (Un)cooperative Federalism
The state enforcement power can counter the increasing influence of the
executive branch on the regulatory agenda and can ensure stronger enforce-
ment." The early environmental administrative regimes commonly provided
for state enforcement. Federal laws such as the Clean Air Act allowed the states
to create and enforce their own regulations under State Implementation Plans
(SIPs), which were subject to approval by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)." Other laws, such as the Clean Water Act, gave states the authority to
48. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MicH. L. REV. 737, 774 (2004)
(describing the myriad ways that federal agencies hear state voices and rely on
state implementation).
49. Catherine Sharkey argues that the rulemaking process should be reformed to take
further account of state regulatory interests. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Ac-
countability: Agency-Forcing Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2163-71 (2009).
50. Cf Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Ap-
proach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (2004) (arguing for a reconceptualization of
administrative law that looks to the arbitrariness of an agency's inaction, rather
than just whether a political branch is accountable).
51, See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that the
saving clause in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not forec-
lose preemption).
52. Cf William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (discussing how federal
floors encourage robust regulation). But see Krent, supra note 14 (arguing that co-
operative federalism is contrary to Article II).
53. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2oo6) ("Each State shall, after reasonable
notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Administrator, within 3 years
(or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) after the promulga-
tion of a national primary ambient air quality standard (or any revision thereof)
under section 7409 of this title for any air pollutant, a plan which provides for im-
plementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each
air quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.").
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amend or reverse federal permitting decisions.14 The superfund law allows for
state enforcement of clean-up standards." This model became known as "coop-
erative federalism."" The cooperation often consisted of parallel state adminis-
trative regimes with local expertise working under the auspices of the federal
agency. The state regimes would issue permits, investigate violations, and issue
sanctions, but with varying degrees of federal oversight. The goal of the pollu-
tion control statutes, and of the scholars who champion cooperative federalism,
is that states support and aid the federal government by providing necessary lo-
cal information and expertise. Cooperative federalism also requires states to ob-
tain federal approval before exercising their authority and receiving federal
funds to implement their programs. Cooperative federalism in environmental
laws has experienced its share of problems over the decades, including overfil-
ing,17 capture,'" and judicial limitations on citizen suits. 9
Congress appears to have embraced cooperative federalism, but not be-
cause of its ability to check under-responsive agencies by creating federal-state
tension.So More commonly, benefits of cooperative federalism are described as
54. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
55. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2) (2oo6).
56. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (describing cooperative
federalism). For a scholarly overview of the development of cooperative federal-
ism, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Fe-
deralism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001).
57. Overfiling occurs when the federal government steps in to modify state action to
address an environmental regulatory violation under the state's purview. Ellen R.
Zahren, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at State Heels To Protect the
Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 373 (2000).
58. Some of the capture problems in the environmental arena come out of the coop-
erative angle of these statutory regimes, in that the state agencies set up to imple-
ment and enforce the federal laws are then subject to the same types of capture as
the federal agency itself. They become, in essence, local branches of the federal
agency. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Penn-
hurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Adminis-
trative State, 82 Tax. L. REV. 1197, 1228-29 (2004).
59. While instructive for other regulatory areas, the cooperative federalism model in
environmental laws and its attendant problems are not entirely transferable. See,
e.g., Reisinger et al., supra note 27, at 16-28 (describing the failures of cooperative
federalism in the environmental arena). Thus, this Article acknowledges these
laws as the closest existing model, but refrains from pressing the analogy too far.
6o. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the En-
forcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1698 (2001) ("In particular,
there are at least three related reasons why the federal government has decided to
promote diversity in federal regulatory regimes: (1) to allow states to tailor federal
regulatory programs to local conditions; (2) to promote competition within a fed-
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allowing for local, targeted solutions within a common regulatory framework;
increasing manpower; and allowing for policy experimentation." However, co-
operative federalism has its limits. While shared enforcement can offer more
manpower and local expertise, something more might be needed to increase the
accountability of federal agencies. According to "uncooperative federalism," a
new understanding of federal-state relations, states can and should challenge
federal decisions." This "uncooperative" function of cooperative federalism
merits scholarly attention, especially given the current state of agency accounta-
bility and aggressive agency preemption. Incorporating this tension between the
states and the federal agencies into a new regulatory framework that focuses on
shared enforcement powers can help to make agencies more accountable for
inaction.6 3
Private rights of action allow states and citizens to sue agencies under cer-
tain circumstances6 4 and force judicial review of some types of federal inaction.
However, private rights of action are limited in their ability to enforce the regu-
lations in the absence of agency action." Although private rights of action can
sometimes encourage enforcement through extra-judicial pressure (in many
cases, by generating media attention), the concurrent state enforcement power
eral regulatory framework; and (3) to permit experimentation with different ap-
proaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy.").
61. Id.
62. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, u18 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009) ("We see examples of uncooperative federalism in such va-
ried arenas as immigration, healthcare, and education. In each of these fields,
states use regulatory power conferred by the federal government to tweak, chal-
lenge, and even dissent from federal law.").
63. Cf Andrew Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federal-
ism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 661-62 (1993) ("Then came the Reagan revolu-
tion, an unprecedented period of antitrust non-enforcement by federal regulators.
That revolution breathed new life into the debate over the role of the states in the
enforcement of competition laws. Armed with the parens patriae powers con-
ferred upon the states by the Hart-Scott Rodino Act in 1976, a rejuvenated alliance
among state antitrust enforcement officials emerged.").
64. For example, citizen suit provisions are common in environmental legislation.
E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2oo6); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2oo6); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2oo6); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2oo6); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2oo6); Emergency Planning and
Community Right To Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2oo6).
65. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (discussing the possibility of re-
view if Congress has clearly prescribed certain actions or priorities that the agency
has not taken); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (explaining
that an agency denial of a petition for rulemaking, while technically inaction, dif-
fers from nonenforcement and is subject to limited review).
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goes further and allows states to enforce regulations when the agency does
not."6 The resulting tension between the state and federal governments leads to
better enforcement because the state is not threatening judicial review of the
agency's decision not to enforce, which could lead to judicially mandated en-
forcement. Instead, the state is stepping in for the federal agency. Thus, the state
enforcement power and the resulting "two master phenomenon" might address
political capture more directly and quickly than private rights of action.' This
is not to say that the state enforcement power should replace private rights of
action; each mechanism addresses different concerns in administrative law.68
II. THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION CASE STUDY
Capture of agencies has been a concern since their creation.9 Executive
administrations in some cases have appointed lobbyists or people with industry
ties to ensure that regulatory agencies advance industry priorities. These ap-
pointments compromise the appearance and reputation of administrative agen-
cies. 70 The Bush Administration appointed enough lobbyists to positions of
power within administrative agencies that special interests appeared to domi-
nate politics.? A 2004 CBS News/New York Times poll found that 64% of Ameri-
66. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2oo8, 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b)
(Supp. II 2009).
67. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 62, at 1270-71 (describing the two-master
phenomenon and how this can increase federal-state tension).
68. Some scholars have addressed how limited preemption can encourage state inno-
vation and ultimately regulatory efficiency, see, e.g., Klass, supra note 27, while
others have focused on expansion of judicial review, see, e.g, Elena Kagan, Presi-
dential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001); Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 83
(2009), and private rights of action, see, e.g., Reisinger et al., supra note 27. All of
these mechanisms are important and address particular areas of agency inaction.
However, state enforcement of federal law in federal court seems to address the
concern of agency underenforcement directly-an area heretofore ignored.
69. According to President Roosevelt, "Great interests... which desire to escape
regulation rightly see that if they can strike at the heart of modern reform by steri-
lizing the administrative tribunal which administers them they will have effective-
ly destroyed the reform itself." Veto Message, Walter-Logan Bill, 86 Cong. Rec.
13,943 (1940).
70. For more on the role executive appointments play in agency action and the cor-
responding appearance of agency unaccountability, see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 441, 453-63 (2010).
71. The Revolving Door Working Group-a broad-based coalition of organizations
ranging from Public Citizen and Common Cause to Farm Aid and Public Em-
ployees for Environmental Responsibility-examined this history in its report, A
Matter of Trust. REVOLVING DOOR WORKING GRP., A MATTER OF TRUST: HOW
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cans agreed with the statement that "government is pretty much run by a few
big interests looking out for themselves."7' The experience of the CPSC was ref-
lective of the Bush Administration's general approach to administrative over-
sight.73 An examination of the failures of the CPSC and the congressional re-
sponse to those failures shows how lax enforcement compromised consumer
protection and weakened the Agency.
A. The Regulatory Players and Recent Agency Inaction
In 2007, President George W. Bush nominated Michael Baroody as chair of
the CPSC. For thirteen years, Mr. Baroody had been chief lobbyist at the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an industry trade group
representing the largest manufacturing firms.74 He withdrew his nomination
THE REVOLVING DooR UNDERMINES PUBLIC TRusT IN GOVERNMENT-AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2005), available at http://www.policyarchive.orgfhandlef
10207/10857. According to the study, the appointment of corporate executives and
business lobbyists to key posts in federal agencies "tends to create a pro-business
bias in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement.... [A) corporate execu-
tive or lobbyist joining the government might not only tend to favor a previous
private-sector employer but might also be ideologically inclined to shape policy to
benefit business in general, as opposed to the broader public interest." Id. at 14.
72. Id. at lo (citing Major Institutions: Government, POLLING REPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm#Government (last visited May 25,
2010)).
73. Cf Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 5, 28 (2009) ("The
combination of a Republican president and Congress in the Bush Administration,
for example, resulted in no meaningful oversight of the White House. Our point
is not partisan; while we largely do not believe that the inaction of the Bush Ad-
ministration was justified, we fully recognize that the election of Republicans will
lead to different regulatory policies than the election of Democrats. But the elec-
tion of either party does not justify inaction-ignoring statutory mandates-
instead of seeking their repeal or amendment. When this happens, both the judi-
cial and electoral accountability mechanisms fail.").
74. In his tenure with NAM, Mr. Baroody attempted to weaken the CPSC and un-
dermine safety proposals. For example, Mr. Baroody "[olpposed a CPSC proposal
to improve safety standards for baby walkers," "[olpposed a petition by consumer
organizations to improve the way that consumers find out about recalls of dan-
gerous children's products," and "supported diluting guidelines companies used
to determine whether they must report substantial product hazards." EMILY GOT-
TLIEB, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, CORPORATE EMPOWERMENT AND THE
DECLINE OF PUBLIC SAFETY 5 (2007), available at http-//www.centerjd.orgl
archives/studies/SafetyWhitePaper.pdf; Press Release, Ctr. for Envtl. Health et al.,
Michael Baroody Is the Wrong Person for the Job, Consumer Groups Warn (Apr.
26, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?lD=2421.
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after his $150,000 severance package from NAM was publicized." President
Bush never nominated another chair, leaving Nancy Nord, one of the CPSC
commissioners he had appointed, as acting chair until the Obama Administra-
tion nominated Inez Moore Tenenbaum as chair in May of 2009.7'
Ms. Nord also had ties to corporate lobbying groups, having served as ex-
ecutive director of the American Corporate Counsel Association and Director
of Consumer Affairs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.? Senate Democrats
and consumer groups repeatedly called for her resignation after she opposed a
bill that would have directed more money and resources to the Agency after
numerous product recalls in 2007.78
Meanwhile, the CPSC was not keeping dangerous products out of the mar-
ketplace. After nine-month-old Liam Johns suffocated in his Simplicity crib,79
the CPSC did nothing. Despite Liam's death, two more infant deaths, seven
75. For criticism of Mr. Baroody's severance package, see Press Release, Office of Sen-
ator Richard Durbin, Durbin, Nelson, Obama Continue To Press for Withdrawal
of Baroody Nomination (May 18, 2007), available at
http:f/durbin.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=274677. For general criticism of Mr. Ba-
roody's nomination, see Press Release, Pub. Citizen, Bush Nominee for Product
Safety Agency Was Top Lobbyist for Industry Group That Pressed To Weaken
Key Safeguards (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
pressroomredirect.cfmn?ID=2430.
76. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Fills New CPSC Posts
(May 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the pressoffice!
President-Obama-Fills-New-CPSC-PostsL. In 2oo6, the CPSC had only two
commissioners and therefore was constrained in what it could do for lack of a qu-
orum. However, in 2007, the CPSC passed an Interim Delegation of Authority es-
tablishing a two-person quorum. Memorandum, Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, Record of Commission Action: Interim Delegation of Authority in the
Absence of a Quorum (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.cpsc.govilibrary/
foia/ballot/balloto7/absencequorum.pdf. The CPSIA reestablished this Interim
Delegation. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 2053
(Supp. II 2009).
77. See Biographical Information, Nancy A. Nord, Commissioner, CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/bios/nord.html (last visited
Aug. 3, 2010).
78. See Consumer Safety Chief Says She Won't Quit, CBS NEws, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/1o/31/nationallmain3434914.shtml; see also
Editorial, Is That Fabulous New Toy Safe?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A26; Jayne
O'Donnel & Liz Szabo, Lawmakers Want CPSC's Chief To Step Down, USA TODAY,
Feb. 5, 2009, at 2B.
79. Maurice Possley, Missteps Delayed Recall of Deadly Cribs, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 24,
2007, http:/Iwww.chicagotribune.comlnews/chi-o70922cribs-story,o,48214story.
The drop rail had separated from its plastic track and formed a gap, which Liam
slipped into feet-first. Instead of falling to the floor, Liam's head became wedged
between the broken drop rail and the mattress, trapping him in a hanging posi-
tion where he was smothered to death. Id.
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nonfatal infant injuries, and fifty-five other incidents, all involving Simplicity's
drop rail, the CPSC did nothing for over two years.So This delay alone is a viola-
tion of CPSC regulations."' It took a series of articles by the Chicago Tribune and
pressure from Illinois's attorney general for the Agency to investigate and recall
nearly one million Simplicity cribs in September 2007.
The CPSC's missteps continued even after the cribs were recalled, however.
Despite the fact that the CPSC is required to ensure that the remedy chosen by
the manufacturer makes the product safe,3 the Agency did not compel Simplic-
ity to make repair kits immediately available to parents wanting to fix their de-
fective cribs; nor did it bar Simplicity from sending out non-CPSC-approved
replacement parts without installation instructions.4 Even five months after the
80. Maurice Possley, Deaths Spur Huge Crib Recall, CHr. TRIB.,
Sept. 22, 2007, http://www.chicagotribune.comlservices/newspaperleedition/chi-
cribs for-satsep22,0,2588630.story; see also Letter from Senator Richard Durbin
to Nancy Nord, Acting Chair, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n (Sept. 25, 2007),
available at http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=284250 ("At sev-
eral points in the process, the CPSC sent investigators to look into the deaths of
these young children. Dozens of reports were submitted to the CPSC. In addition,
families were pursuing legal action against the manufacturer of these prod-
ucts. The fact that it has taken more than four years from the date of the first inci-
dent report and more than two years since the first report of an infant's death to
announce a recall of these products is alarming. It is unacceptable for the public
to have to rely on journalists for this Commission to act in a timely fashion.").
81. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC Earns Hammer
Award for Fast Track Product Recall Program (Feb. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.bhsi.org/cpscacts.htm ("By law, companies are required to report the
discovery of a potential product defect to CPSC.... If there is a defect, the staff
then negotiates a voluntary recall or repair program with the company. This
process can take 90 to 120 days.").
82. See Possley, supra note 79 ("'We get so many cases,' explained Michael Ng, the
CPSC investigator assigned to look into Liam's death. 'Once I do a report, I send
it in and that's it. I go to the next case. We could spend more time, but we are un-
der the gun. We have to move on."'); Maurice Possley, Madigan Urges New Cribs
or Refunds in Recall, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2007, http://iwww.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/southsouthwest/chicribs26sep26,o,1791767.story [hereinafter Possley,
Madigan Urges]. Two years after the CPSC was first informed of the dangerous
defect in these cribs, but within a week of the Tribune's sharing its investigative
findings with the agency, a CPSC spokesman stated: "'We want parents to
know... [w]e do not want your child in that crib tonight."' Possley, supra note
80.
83. See Annys Shin, Infant Deaths Lead to Big Crib Recall; Actions of CPSC Face New
Criticism, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/200709/2/AR2oo7o921lo57.html.
84. See Possley, Madigan Urges, supra note 82. The CPSC has issued a handful of re-
calls of other cribs and bassinets since the Simplicity recall, with each recall shed-
ding a bit more light on the immense regulatory gap created by Reagan-era poli-
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recall, the CPSC "refuse[d] to release information on the progress of the Sim-
plicity recall,... [including] refus[ing] to say if kits [had] been mailed out, if
further injuries [had] taken place or what actions Simplicity is [had taken] to
remedy the situation.""* This is one example of many where the CPSC failed to
follow its own recall and investigatory protocols.16
The crib problems were not isolated regulatory failures. Throughout these
years of inadequate leadership, the CPSC failed to keep dangerous and defective
products off the shelves and had a poor investigatory and enforcement response
once dangerous products were discovered.17 For example, from 20o5 to 2007,
there were, on average, 62,900 emergency injuries each year linked to products
marketed for children younger than five, like baby carriers, car seats, and
cribs." Recalls came late, as with the recall of Evenflo high chairs after 1140 re-
ports of injuries." In another example, the dangers posed by magnets in toys
were reported to the CPSC as early as 2005, yet no action was taken until March
of 2006, and even then the CPSC "issued a weak, confusing recall, leaving dan-
gerous products on store shelves. It wasn't until almost two years later that a full
recall was announced."o Fines were virtually nonexistent, even for companies
cies requiring the CPSC to defer to voluntary industry standards and the industry
push to cut costs. Patricia Callahan, Hidden Crib Dangers, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 15, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-
081115cribs,o,4984240.story.
85. KIDS IN DANGER, 2007: THE YEAR OF THE RECALL: AN EXAMINATION OF CHILD-
REN'S PRODUCT RECALLS IN 2007 AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD
SAFETY 12 (2008), available at http://www.kidsindanger.org/publications/reports/
2008_Year of the-recall.pdf.
86. Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act gives the CPSC the authority to
recall a product if that product is a substantial hazard. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (2oo6).
The Agency also has the authority to govern the refund and repair processes for
defective products already in people's homes. Id. In contrast to its initial dange-
rously slow response, after much media attention, the CPSC has now recalled over
seven million cribs. See Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
CPSC Issues Warning on Drop-Side Cribs (May 7, 2010), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtmblio225.html. Under new leadership
and the guidance of stronger legislation, the current CPSC has now gone so far as
to draft new standards for cribs, effectively banning the drop-side cribs. Id.
87. See, e.g., KIDS IN DANGER, Toxic TOYS AND FAULTY CRIBS: AN EXAMINATION OF
CHILDREN'S PRODUCT RECALLS IN 2008, RECALL EFFECTIVENESS AT CPSC AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD SAFETY 10-12 (2009), available at
http://www.kidsindanger.org/publications/reports/toxictoysfaultycribsreport.pdf
88. RISANA T. CHOWDHURY, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, NURSERY PROD-
UCT-RELATED INJURIES AND DEATHS AMONG CHILDREN UNDER AGE FIVE, at 4
(2009), available at http://www.cpsc.govilibrary/nurseryo8.pdf.
89. KIDs IN DANGER, supra note 87, at 7.
go. KIDS IN DANGER, supra note 85, at 4.
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with repeated recalls.9' The CPSC showed a tendency to settle with manufactur-
ers rather than prosecute violations of safety regulations.92
In 2007, some states determined it was time to attempt to fill the vast feder-
al regulatory void. Media investigations and public outcry spurred a few state
attorneys general to act.93 States such as Oregon, New Jersey, Washington, Mar-
yland, and Illinois passed their own laws governing the recall process in 2oo8.94
Although it is unclear whether these recent CPSC failures were due to a regula-
tory failure, an enforcement failure, an institutional failure resulting from a lack
of funding and political support, or some combination of the three, Congress
would soon enact comprehensive reform.
B. A Legislative Solution: The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of
2008
Recognizing both the massive regulatory failure to protect consumers and
the corresponding increase in state actions to address this failure, Congress
overwhelmingly passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(CPSIA) in July 2oo8,9' and President Bush signed it into law the following
month. This landmark legislation gives the CPSC more power and funding,
creates stricter safety standards?' and gives state attorneys general authority to
enforce product safety laws. It also grants significant protections to whistleb-
lowers, who often alert authorities to unsafe products and practices.97
91. Id. at 12.
92. KIDS IN DANGER, SMOLDERING HAZARDS: FIRE AND BURN HAZARDS OF
CHILDREN'S PRODucT RECALLS, 2002-2007, at 14 (2007), available at http://www
.kidsindanger.org/publications/reports/2oo7_BurnReport.pdf
93. See infra Part III.
94. Joseph Pereira, States Alter Rules of the Game on Safety for Toy Makers, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 25, 2oo8, at Bi.
95. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No, 110-314, 122 Stat.
3016 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Consumer
Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
96. Specifically, lead is essentially banned from toys and children's products, see id. §
101; toxic phthalates (plastic softeners) are banned from children's products, id. §
io8; children's products must meet rigorous mandatory standards and safety test-
ing, id. §§ 102, 104, 1o6; the CPSC must establish new safety standards for all-
terrain vehicles, id. § 232; consumers will have access to a public database on un-
safe products, id. § 212; children's products must have tracking labels so officials
can trace a recalled product back to its factory, id. § 103; and the CPSC will see
substantial increases in funding and other resources and enhanced authority to
conduct recalls and levy higher civil penalties, id. §§ 201, 214, 217.
97. See id. § 219.
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The CPSIA allows a state attorney general to bring a suit in federal court for
injunctive relief on behalf of the residents in that state against parties violating
the statute?" Under section 218(b), state attorneys general may sue on behalf of
their states' residents in order to stop the sale of products that have been re-
called, banned, or are not certified as tested under the Act's requirements; that
lack tracking labels or contain unauthorized safety markings; or that otherwise
violate the CPSC's requirements. States were also empowered to enforce prohi-
bitions against stockpiling products before the law's changes took effect. The
CPSIA explicitly permits private counsel to assist state attorneys general and
limits the private counsel's use of privileged information."
The Commission must be notified thirty days before a state files any en-
forcement suit, unless the state determines that the product constitutes a "sub-
stantial product hazard.""oo Before the CPSIA was passed, only the Commission
could determine that a product constituted a substantial product hazard."'
Now, if a state independently determines that a substantial product hazard ex-
ists, it may file suit, but must notify the Commission. The Commission retains
the right to intervene in any such action.0 2
The CPSIA contains limited preemption language,"3 exempting more
stringent state labeling requirements like California's Proposition 65, while
preempting recent state legislation attempting to address the same area as the
CPSIA.10 4 Notably, states may apply for an exemption from the preemption
provision."' The CPSIA also explicitly prohibits the Commission from modify-
98. See id. § 218(b)(1) ("State Attorney General Enforcement-(i)Right of Action-
Except as provided in paragraph (5), the attorney general of a State, or other au-
thorized State officer, alleging a violation of 19(a)(1),(2),(5),(6),(7),(9), or (12) of
this Act that affects or may affect such State or its residents may bring an action
on behalf of the residents of the State in any United States district court for the
district in which the defendant is found or transacts business to obtain appropri-
ate injunctive relief.").
99. See id. § 218(b)(6). The CPSIA does not address fee arrangements between state
attorneys general and private counsel.
1oo. Id. § 218(b)(2)(A)-(E).
io. See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (2010).
102. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act § 218(b)(3).
103. Id. § 231(b) ("Nothing in this Act or the Federal Hazardous Substances Act shall
be construed to preempt or otherwise affect any warning requirement relating to
consumer products or substances that is established pursuant to State law that was
in effect on August 31, 2003.").
104. Id. Proposition 65, passed in 1986, contains very stringent labeling requirements
regarding the content of lead, phthalate, and many other chemicals in all products
sold in California. Proposition 65, Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2oo6).
105. To be eligible for an exemption from preemption, the state law must have been in
effect on August 13, 2008 and the state must have applied by November 12, 2008.
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ing these preemption provisions through a rule, regulation, preamble, policy
statement, or executive branch statement.1o6 There is also a saving clause pro-
tecting the right of state attorneys general to sue under state laws." 7
Such a major regulatory overhaul was not passed easily. The Bush Adminis-
tration and the CPSC, led by Nancy Nord, fought hard to curtail state enforce-
ment mechanisms, remove whistle-blower protections, and remove the phtha-
late ban.' Lobbyists for Exxon Mobil, the world's largest manufacturer of
phthalates, led the charge against the phthalate ban.0 9 NAM lobbied strongly
against whistleblower protections and state enforcement powers.no
For more on which state laws are exempt from preemption, see FAQs for Section
231: Preemption, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/faq/231faq.html.
106. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act § 231(a).
107. See id. § 218(b)(4) ("Nothing in this section.... shall be construed . . . to prevent
the attorney general of a State, or other authorized State officer, from exercising
the powers conferred on the attorney general, or other authorized State officer, by
the laws of such State; or to prohibit the attorney general of a State, or other au-
thorized State officer, from proceeding in State or Federal court on the basis of an
alleged violation of any civil or criminal statute of that State.").
108. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. ET AL., TOTAL RECALL: THE NEED FOR CPSC
REFORM Now I (2008), available at http://www.consumerfed.orglelementslwww
.consumerfed.org/file/health/TOTAL RECALL.pdf; see also Natural Res. Def.
Council v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 370, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that an opinion letter by Acting Commissioner Nord at-
tempting to delay the phthalate ban after it was passed by Congress "fails to con-
sider the vast majority of the relevant language of the statute and all of the rele-
vant statutory context, is not well reasoned, and reaches a result that undermines
the purpose of the CPSA and the CPSIA").
109. Joseph S. Enoch, Consumer Advocates Blame Lobbyists for Delays in New Toy Safety
Rules, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (July 23, 2oo8), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/
newso4/2oo8/07/cpsc_congressO5.html (quoting Public Citizen's Ed Mierzwinski
as saying that "'Exxon has spent $8 million on lobbying so far this year, much of
which is lobbying against this consumer safety bill"'). Phthalates, a group of
chemicals added to polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to make it pliable, are known endo-
crine disruptors and possible carcinogens. Many studies have shown the toxic ef-
fects of phthalates. See, e.g., Statement of Jane Houlihan, Vice President for Re-
search, Envtl. Working Grp., to the Nat'l Research Council Comm. on the Health
Risks of Phthalates, Protecting Public Health from Phthalates Will Require Con-
sideration of Cumulative Risks (December 18, 2007), available at
http://www.ewg.org/files/NASphthalatefinal.pdf. Baby boys and pregnant women
are among the most vulnerable to its effects and the most laden with the chemical.
Id. Not enough research has been done on the cumulative effects of exposure to
these chemicals, but it is known that infants and small children are more suscept-
ible to overload. See N.Y. Pus. INTEREST GRP., TROUBLE IN TOYLAND: THE 24TH
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Industry lobbyists and the CPSC continued to resist the CPSIA even after it
was passed. The CPSC refused to issue implementing regulations and regulatory
guidelines, especially those carving out exceptions to the law's lead require-
ments,"' claiming that it was powerless to draft guidelines. Although Congress
stressed the need for the CPSC to quickly define exceptions to the lead provi-
sions, the Agency claimed that the required process was too burdensome."2 The
CPSC also argued that since any exceptions needed to be based on sound
science, the process would take time."3
The Agency also managed to thwart congressional intent by quickly ex-
empting existing stock from the phthalate ban.' 4 The Natural Resources De-
fense Council and Public Citizen filed a lawsuit,"' and the district court agreed
that the CPSC action violated the CPSIA and was therefore void."
The CPSC's refusal to carry out its mandate led to confusion in the mar-
ketplace and prompted a significant public relations campaign against the
CPSIA. Manufacturers and corporate lobbyists, concerned primarily with the
law's whistleblower protections and state enforcement powers, organized an In-
ternet-fueled campaign against the CPSIA."7 Using the CPSC's seemingly deli-
report-archives/healthy-communities/healthy-communities/trouble-in-toyland-
the-24th-annual-survey-of-toy-safety.
no. Enoch, supra note 109.
in. Letter from Thomas H. Moore, Comm'r, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
to Senators John D. Rockefeller, IV, Mark L. Pryor, and Representatives Henry A.
Waxman and Bobby L. Rush 3-4 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
PR/Mooreo2o3O9.pdf.
n2. Letter from Nancy Nord, Comm'r, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, to Sen-
ators John D. Rockefeller, IV, and Mark L. Pryor and Representatives Henry A.
Waxman and Bobby L. Rush 2 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
pr/nordo3009.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 597 F. Supp.
2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo9). In November 2008, the CPSC received a request from
unidentified lobbyists that the phthalate ban apply only to production of new toys
and that remaining stocks be allowed to be stockpiled and sold to customers inde-
finitely, so long as they were manufactured before the date the law was to take ef-
fect. See id. at 370. Days later, the CPSC issued a legal opinion permitting the
stockpiling of products containing the banned chemical. Id. at 388-89.
115. See id. at 370.
n16. Id. at 388-89.
117. Throughout the "CPSIA blogging day" (which no particular group claims respon-
sibility for organizing), an "informational post" widely circulated around the blo-
gosphere contained links to articles written by Manhattan Institute Fellow Walter
Olson. See Walter Olson, Tomorrow (Wed.) CPSIA Blogging Day, OVERLAWYERED
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://overlawyered.com/2009/oi/tomorrow-wed-cpsia-blogging-
day/. Olsen then organized and compiled these blog entries in his own blog, Over-
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berate failure to clarify the impact of the law on small businesses as a catalyst,
industry groups like the Manhattan Institute reached out to small business
owners and fomented significant Internet-based resistance to the law."' The
groups focused on the compliance deadlines to anger merchants who were nev-
er contemplated as the main targets of the law."9 Small business owners, book
publishers, secondhand retailers, and librarians had legitimate concerns about
testing and certification requirements, concerns that Congress always intended
the CPSC to address. According to Commissioner Thomas Moore:
[Tihere are orchestrated campaigns to undermine the Act. They are
sowing the seeds of confusion that are upsetting so many small busi-
nesses. They are seizing on the Commission's lack of positive guidance
to cause some Members of Congress who voted for the legislation to
forget why they voted for it in the first place-to protect children and
families who cannot protect themselves from defective or hazardous
products. Some of the very businesses who are now behind the cam-
paigns to change the Act were the ones whose actions led to its pas-
sage.120
After the Internet campaign reached a high decibel, Ms. Nord's CPSC
stayed the testing and certification requirements for one year and began to draft
exemptions for certain industries and materials."' However, the CPSC's stay did
not nullify state enforcement powers under the new law, a development that
further highlights the importance of such powers. While industry lobbyists were
able to influence the Agency, such lobbying generally does not reach the offices
of all fifty state attorneys general.
lawyered. See Walter Olson, CPSIA Blog Day #i, OVERLAWYERED (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://overlawyered.com/2009/ol/cpsia-blog-day-1-past-cpsia-bloggers/; cf Rode-
rick M. Hills, Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legis-
lative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2007) (describing the tendency of business
interests, like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to strongly oppose state enforce-
ment).
nS. For more on both the industry ties and the history of "junk" scholarship from the
Manhattan Institute, see Fact Sheet: Manhattan Institute, CENTER FOR
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, http://www.centerjd.org/archives/issues-facts/stories/MB
_manhattan.php (last visited June 6, 2010).
1u9. Letter, supra note in.
120. Id.
121. Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Statement of Acting Chair-
man Nancy Nord on the Stay of Enforcement of Certain Testing and Certification
Requirements of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (Jan. 30,
2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtmlo9/ogu5nord.pdf.
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C. Overcoming Agency Failures Through a Renewed Federalism Approach to
Enforcement
The CPSC failures are typical and could serve as an indictment of the ad-
ministrative system in its entirety.2 2 However, another way to understand this
story is as an instance where Congress attempted to assert control over a cap-
tured agency that was no longer regulating in the public interest."' This effort
reflects a renewed focus on enforcement mechanisms and access to courts as a
means of forcing agencies to uphold the public interest.2 4
Defining "public interest" is difficult. Some scholars define it as regulation
that "improves social welfare" and, more specifically, regulation that does not
allow special interests to collect "supercompetitive returns" that in turn create
losses that harm the remainder of society.' 5 In the context of consumer protec-
tion, the public interest largely consists of the health and safety of consumers,
and anti-public-interest behavior is the absence of regulation or enforcement.126
Thus, this Article is less concerned with the deliberative process by which regu-
lators produce regulations 7 than with the types of enforcement mechanisms
available to the public to hold an agency accountable for not enforcing its own
regulations, to ensure regulations are enforced, and to act when the agency has
chosen not to regulate.
The Court's long-standing reluctance to review instances where agencies
have chosen not to act, even when not enforcing their own interpretations of
122. Cf Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 24, at 1751-56 (providing an overview of the
scholarly literature on capture and administrative regimes).
123. Cf Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682-83 (1975) (describing the problem of an agency no longer
functioning in the public interest due to capture by the regulated industry).
124. See Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 2214; see also Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 24,
at 1755 (discussing the legislative and lobbying history of the CPSIA and suggest-
ing that the media attention and publicity surrounding dangerous toys helped
public interest groups defeat business lobbyists).
125. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POssIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 10 (2007).
126. This has been described as the "activist theory of regulation." See Barry Boyer &
Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 884-89
(1985).
127. Examples of such institutional concerns and reforms would be regulations affect-
ing transparency measures during the notice-and-comment phase, clear preemp-
tion statements, whistleblower immunity, the expansion of public databases, and
other sunshine measures. While these examples are all relevant to increasing
agency accountability and public trust in the role of agencies generally, such
measures go to the process of rulemaking rather than the enforcement of congres-
sional mandates or even established regulations.
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violations of their own regulations, is often criticized."' The Court often refers
to the independent role of the executive branch in making enforcement deci-
sions."' The doctrines of nonreviewability and standing reinforce the impor-
tance of the executive in holding agencies accountable. 30 However, recent his-
tory shows a breakdown of accountability and demonstrates the need to
reevaluate the understanding of the executive as a "proxy" for democratic ac-
countability.3 ' Spreading accountability across multiple parties (i.e., including a
substantial role for states) could help to counter industry capture and other
sources of underenforcement. In addition, courts should consider whether an
agency's inaction is arbitrary, instead of avoiding this question through unre-
viewability doctrines; doing so would encourage regulation and strengthen
agency legitimacy."' One remaining problem is that the harms of inaction are
128. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 50, at 1658 ("The Supreme Court's reluctance to
allow judicial review of such inaction rests, implicitly, on a theory of agency legi-
timacy that is inconsistent with the founding principles of the administrative
state.").
129. But see Mary Cheh, When Congress Demands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts To Enforce the
Law, 72 GEO. WAsa. L. Rnv. 253, 265 (2003) ("[Clourt intervention no longer
turns on whether an executive official has discretion to act. In the agency context,
Congress has directed that discretion itself is reviewable.").
130. See Cass Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm.
L. REV. 653, 669-70 (1985) ("Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that a court engag-
ing in judicial review of executive inaction or issuing an order compelling an
agency to act would be undertaking to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted'-an executive rather than a judicial task. The suggestion is based on the
understanding that enforcement activity is entrusted to the executive, not to the
courts, and that judicial involvement-in the form of a decree compelling prose-
cution-would violate the separation of powers." (footnotes omitted)).
131. Criddle, supra note 30, at 461 (criticizing the notion of the President as a "proxy"
for democratic accountability in agency decision making); see also Bressman &
Vandenbergh, supra note 39, at 53-56 (examining the theoretical history of the
"presidential control" model of administrative law and questioning its political
reality); Cheh, supra note 129, at 265 (" [J]udicial review of agency decisions may
be viewed as a usurpation of power by the less democratically accountable branch,
the judiciary, to the injury of the more democratically accountable body, the ad-
ministrative agency. The agency is more accountable, it is said, because it answers
to the oversight of an elected Congress and is more immediately controlled by the
elected executive. But these are inaccurate portrayals in the case of congressional
commands and politically inspired executive inaction." (footnotes omitted)); Ru-
benstein, supra note 29, at 2186 ("IMany criticize the notion that the President is
meaningfully held accountable for administrative action, thus derailing the agen-
cy's best claim to a democratic pedigree superior to courts.").
132. Bressman, supra note so, at 1657 ("[Algency inaction raises a concern for adminis-
trative arbitrariness because it is susceptible to the same narrow influences that
derail agency action from public purposes. Agency inaction that reflects such in-
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sometimes distributed throughout society in a way that frustrates political ac-
countability because of organizational problems, 13 information gaps, 134 or tim-
ing issues. 3 In these cases, providing both state and federal mechanisms can
help overcome some of these collective action problems because smaller groups
might better mobilize the political force needed to provide accountability." 6
III. Do ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST? A LOOK
AT STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ENFORCEMENT
State attorneys general have long-standing relationships with federal agen-
cies. Cooperative federalism regulatory regimes, first appearing in the 1970s,
have become increasingly common. 13 7 Such regimes create creative combina-
tions of federal and state authority, and many times the state enforcement au-
thority is not granted directly, but rather implied or swallowed up into a host of
state regulatory functions.' 8^ Cooperative federalism regimes also assume that
preemption of concurrent state laws and regulations will be limited, with feder-
fluences, though often rational from a political standpoint, nonetheless is arbi-
trary and objectionable from a democratic perspective.").
133. Hills, supra note 117, at ni (describing such problems and how they appear in ad-
ministrative agency decision making).
134. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 24, at 1783 (proposing information gathering and
sharing as a means to promote agency accountability).
135. By the time the electorate can change the executive branch, irrevocable harm may
have occurred.
136. Cf Hills, supra note 117, at ni ("The national government would be dominated by
narrow interest groups that seek concentrated and homogenous private benefits
for their constituents at the expense of the less cohesive, more numerous general
public." (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 3 (1971))).
137. Weiser, supra note 60, at 1694.
138. Id. Examples of the "classic" cooperative federalism statutes are the Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 33 U.S.C.), which authorizes states to administer and enforce the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program; the Clean Air Act, ch.
360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
which authorizes states to create State Implementation Plans (SIPs) that guide the
states' enforcement of the federal law; and the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, no Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.), which gives state agencies authority to regulate under the FCC's over-
sight. The Telecommunications Act especially, however, is vague about state en-
forcement of federal law, resulting in a situation where the "the federal courts
have failed to appreciate this feature of the Act's cooperative federalism design."
Philip Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. Sr. L. REV.
727, 731.
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al regulations serving as a floor, not a ceiling.139 During the 199os, Congress in-
creasingly delegated to states the power to enforce agency regulations, most
notably in laws governing telecommunications and credit.1 4 Recently, the laws
and proposed bills that include such state enforcement powers concern today's
most controversial areas of regulatory reform. 4'
It is unclear whether recent judicial and congressional attempts to restore
the federalism balance in administrative law were prompted by increasingly ag-
gressive administrative preemption or shifting political agendas.1 42 The trend,
however, offers an opportunity to fix an ailing regulatory system. A look at state
actions intended to do the work of the CPSC in its absence reveals how a state
enforcement power might improve consumer protection.
A. State Lawsuits Using State Laws
Because states are rarely granted the power to enforce federal law in federal
courts, the majority of state enforcement actions are brought under state law.
139. Cf Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1430-31 (1984) (explaining that, during the early
1980s, states responded to the decrease in federal regulatory action with stricter
regulation, which, in turn, elicited more administrative preemption).
140. See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 15 U.S.C. 5 227(f) (2oo6);
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006); Credit
Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679h (2o6); Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 6103 (2006).
141. Legislation in areas of consumer product safety, financial reform, and health in-
surance reform have all included statutory grants of state power to enforce the
federal law. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042, 124 Stat. 1376, 2012 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5552); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. 5 2073(b)
(Supp. II 2009); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. §
132od-5(d) (West 2oo) (expressly authorizing state attorneys general to enforce
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 through civil en-
forcement actions). Proposals in areas of climate change regulation and mortgage
regulation have also included such grants. See American Clean Energy and Securi-
ty Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, nith Cong. (2009); Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, imth Cong. (2009).
142. Cf Matthew R. Cody, Special Solicitude for States in the Standing Analysis: A New
Type of Federalism, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 149 (2009) (asserting that federal
preemption of state regulation of greenhouse gases prompted liberalized standing
doctrine espoused in Massachusetts v. EPA). A change in presidential administra-
tions also precipitated a new shift away from aggressive preemption. See Memo-
randum from the President of the United States to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts &
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 22, 2009) (requiring all administrative agencies
to revisit every preemption decision made over the past ten years and mandating
both that future preemption decisions not be announced in preambles and that
the agencies otherwise conform to "legal principles governing preemption").
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Such actions can address dangerous or deceptive practices. For example, states
attorneys general in New York, California, and Vermont have successfully sued
or threatened to sue under state laws to prevent dangerous products from
reaching consumers. In 2007, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo re-
lied on state law, which imposed mandatory limits on lead levels (as opposed to
the voluntary limits imposed by the federal government), to reach a national
settlement with retailers of recalled jewelry. 43 California Attorney General Jerry
Brown sued manufacturers of toys'44 and a manufacturer of synthetic turf'4 for
violating strict lead regulations in California's Proposition 65,146 eventually
reaching settlements to reduce lead levels in those products.'4 And Vermont
Attorney General William Sorrell sued Dollar Tree under the state consumer
fraud act for selling lead- and cadmium-laced jewelry that had been recalled,
143. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Att'y Gen., Cuomo Reaches Settlements with Ma-jor Retailers To Remove Lead-Contaminated Children's Jewelry from Stores Na-
tionwide (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/
2007/nov/nov21aO7.html. The settlement allowed the attorney general's office to
assess penalties if the retailers continued to sell tainted products. See Louise Story,
New York Aids in Jewelry Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/business/21cnd-recall.html.
144. Press Release, Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., Brown Sues Toy Companies for Lead
(Nov. 19, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.govinewsalerts/release.php?id=1497. In
announcing the lawsuit, Attorney General Brown stated: "Companies must take
every reasonable step to assure that the products they handle are safe for children
and their families and fully comply with the laws of California. Despite the leng-
thening global supply chain, every company that does business in this state must
follow the law and protect consumers from lead and other toxic materials." Id.
145. Press Release, Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., Brown Reaches Settlement To Reduce
Children's Lead Exposure in Artificial Turf (July 16, 2oo), available at http://
ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1953.
146. Proposition 65, Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006) (requiring manufacturers to pro-
vide warnings before placing certain chemicals, including lead, into the stream of
commerce).
147. California reached an agreement with the toy companies to adopt stricter stan-
dards for their products than those provided in the federal law. Marc Lifsher, Toy
Makers Settle Lead Lawsuit, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 20o8, http://articles.latimes.com/
2008/dec/05/business/fi-lead5. The settlement, reached after passage of the CPSIA,
required these manufacturers to meet the new federal standards under the CPSIA
by December 2008 in California (rather than the February 20o9 deadline provided
by the federal law). Id. The agreement also stipulated that the companies would
pay $550,000 for lead testing and improved customer information. Id. The settle-
ment with the manufacturer of artificial turf fined and penalized the manufactur-
er and required it to remove lead from the turf as well as to notify previous buy-
ers. Marc Lifsher, Astro Turf Will Get the Lead Out, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/15/business/fi-astroturf-leadl5.
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eventually reaching a settlement in 2010 that called for Dollar Tree to pay a
sioo,ooo fine.'48
Federal agencies have used expansive preemption to target these kinds of
state actions. For example, in 2oo6, the CPSC passed an unprecedented regula-
tion that preempted state laws and regulations governing mattress flammability
requirements.'49 Once an agency preempts all state laws, or even state common
law, state attorneys general are no longer able to enforce consumer protections
in these areas, even if federal agencies are not enforcing their own regulations.
B. Other Tools Available to State Attorneys General
Even before the CPSIA, states attempted to hold the CPSC accountable
through various extra-legal tools, such as writing letters to the CPSC, launching
media campaigns, investigating consumer dangers, and building coalitions with
other states. Although these tools can increase consumer awareness and influ-
ence industries, they are less effective than a full enforcement power under state
or federal law.
The CPSC's failures with crib safety, for example, prompted Illinois Attor-
ney General Madigan to publicly call on the CPSC to provide consumers with
refunds or new cribs instead of repair kits after the cribs had been recalled.'
The CPSC at the time opposed Attorney General Madigan's public proposals,
arguing that her office was doing a "disservice to consumers."'
The Illinois Attorney General also began to investigate resales of recalled
cribs, publicly criticizing the CPSC for allowing this loophole and noting that a
federal recall does not increase safety if the cribs continue to be sold on the In-
ternet and in the secondary market.52
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal wrote a charged public
letter to the Agency regarding what he termed "a grossly inadequate and badly
148, Vt. Settles Complaint with Dollar Tree Stores, BosTON.cOM (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2010/02/08/vtsettlescompl
aintwithdollartreestores/.
149. See Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71
Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2oo6) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633 (2010)) ("The
Commission intends and expects that the new mattress flammability standard will
preempt inconsistent state standards and requirements, whether in the form of
positive enactments or court created requirements."). For more on both the wea-
kening of the CPSC and its simultaneous preemption of state law, see Sharkey, su-
pra note i, at 230-33.
i5o. Possley, Madigan Urges, supra note 82.
151. Megan Twohey, Maker: Repair Kit Isn't Ready for Recalled Cribs: Company Sends
Parts Without Instructions, CH I. TRI B., Sept. 29, 2007, at 1.
152. Press Release, Office of Ill. Att'y Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Calls on CPSC To
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flawed study in declaring synthetic turf safe to install and play on."' The letter
urged the CPSC to retract its earlier announcement that such turf was safe and
revise its "crudely cursory" investigation of the possible effects of artificial
turf.54 Moreover, Blumenthal announced that Connecticut would conduct its
own state investigation as to whether artificial turf was safe.'
Massachusetts spearheaded a multistate investigation of toy safety, resulting
in a consent decree between Massachusetts, thirty-eight other states, and Mattel
that required the company to pay $12 million to the states and to meet the new
CPSIA standards by August 2oog."
In November 2007, the CPSC recalled over 500,000 pieces of children's je-
welry due to high lead levels, prompted by information given to the federal
agency by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.'5 7
153. Press Release, Office of Conn. Att'y Gen. Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General
Calls Synthetic Turf Study Dangerously Defective, Urges Its Removal and Revi-
sion (Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=
421480&A=2795; see also id. ("For the sake of public health and safety, Blumenthal
said the CPSC has a moral and possibly legal obligation to immediately remove
and revise its synthetic turf report from its website. 'This report and release are as
deceptive as some of the advertising and marketing of consumer products prose-
cuted by the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general,' Blumenthal
said.").
154. Id.
155. Id. Days after Attorney General Blumenthal's public criticism, the California at-
torney general filed a lawsuit against artificial turf makers for violations of Cali-
fornia lead safety limit laws. See Marc Lifsher, Suit Sets Stage for Artificial Turf
War, L.A. TIMCs, Sept. 4, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/seplo4/business/
fi-turf4.
156. Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen. of Mass., Massachusetts Attorney General
Martha Coakley and 38 other AGs Reach $12 Million Settlement with Mattel Re-
garding Toys Recalled for Excessive Lead Paint (Dec. 15, 20o8), available
at http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=cagopressrelease&L=i&Lo=Home&sid=Cago&b
=pressrelease&f=2oo812 15 mattel multistate agreement&csid=Cago. Although
Massachusetts eventually filed a lawsuit under its state consumer protection laws,
the multistate investigation into the practices of Mattel in regards to lead in toys
was brought under the common-law powers of investigation possessed by all state
attorneys general, which are not tied to any specific state or federal law. Cf Flori-
da ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268 (nth Cir. 1976) ("[T]he attor-
neys general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. Their
duties and powers typically are not exhaustively defined by either constitution or
statute but include all those exercised at common law. There is and has been no
doubt that the legislature may deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but
in the absence of such legislative action, he typically may exercise all such authori-
ty as the public interest requires.").
157. Press Release, supra note 143.
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C. Using a State Enforcement Power
A state enforcement power allows a state to enforce regulations even when
the state's laws are preempted, the agency fails to enforce its regulations, and a
captured executive branch does not reprimand the agency. Two state actions
taken under the CPSIA's grant of enforcement power to the states illustrate the
importance of this power. After the CPSC drafted a guideline clarifying that the
CPSIA's phthalate limits applied only to toys manufactured after February io,
2009, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal both wrote to the
CPSC*' and later filed a brief in a federal district court, challenging the agency's
interpretation.' 9 Once the court agreed that the CPSC had misinterpreted Con-
gress's intent to ban all toys that could not meet the phthalate limits, Attorney
General Blumenthal issued a press release claiming that the Agency had chosen
to "protect[] profits over public health," and that his office would "take what-
ever steps are necessary to ensure that the phthalate ban is enforced.""o The
state enforcement power within the CPSIA gave him the authority to threaten
such future action, thus creating an incentive for the Agency to enforce the ban
going forward.
Also after the CPSIA was enacted, California Attorney General Brown
wrote a letter to Target regarding its sale of lead-laced teddy bears. Brown ar-
gued that sale of the bears violated federal law, and the bears were immediately
removed from the shelves.'"' With the power to enforce federal law, state attor-
neys general can step in when a federal agency is under-regulating and a viola-
tion of federal law is left unaddressed, resulting in greater enforcement.
The CPSC's failure to initiate enforcement actions throughout this period
highlights the importance of state-initiated enforcement actions and private
rights of action. In the cases noted above, the states proved more effective than
the CPSC due to a combination of stricter state laws like California's Proposi-
tion 65 and a more focused political will to hold industries accountable for their
faulty and defective products. State innovation and initiative in the consumer
protection domain are on the rise.' Expanding the arsenal of enforcement
158. Press Release, Office of Conn. Att'y Gen. Blumenthal, Attorney General Praises
Decision Blocking Manufacturers from Allowing Sale of Toxic Toys (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?a=3673&Q=433514 (refe-
rencing a letter to the CPSC).
159. Brief for the State of Connecticut as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Natural
Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 597 F. Supp. 2d
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. o8 Civ. 10507), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/AmicusCT.pdf.
16o. Press Release, supra note 158.
161. California: Target Recalls Valentine Bears, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/02/xo/us/iobrfs-TARGETRECALLBRF.html.
162. Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM.
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2009).
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weapons also allows attorneys general in states with fewer consumer protection
laws to enforce federal laws in federal court. Conferring such power upon the
state attorneys general can place consumer protection issues higher on the
states' political agendas. Granting states a co-enforcement power strengthens
tools already at the states' disposal. Finally, the exercise of state enforcement
powers does not raise complex jurisprudential issues, including the limits of
judicial review and an unclear standing doctrine. Any meaningful overhaul of
the CPSC needed to include a state enforcement power to counter the Agency's
underenforcement.
IV. THE EXPANSION OF STANDING AND LIMITATION OF PREEMPTION
In the CPSIA example, the legislative decision to grant state attorneys gen-
eral enforcement powers reflects a larger institutional goal of agency renewal
and stronger consumer protection. Administrative and constitutional law doc-
trines often track each other, and recent Supreme Court decisions expanding
state standing to challenge federal agency inaction and limiting agency preemp-
tion of state remedies coincide with the legislative trends.6 3 However, although
Congress and the Court seem to focus on a similar problem of agency inaction
and a federalism-based accountability solution, the legislative grant focuses on a
public-law right to enforce regulations. In contrast, expanding the standing
doctrine to allow states more power to challenge agency inaction is a private-
law mechanism focused on challenging agencies for their inaction.'6 These pa-
rallel yet distinct trends perhaps signal a renewed focus on the "public interest
concern of agencies.""
163. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that Massachusetts
had standing to petition for review of the EPA's decision not to regulate green-
house gasses); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (holding that Congress did
not intend to alter the federal-state balance with respect to the Controlled Sub-
stances Act). But see Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587
(2007) (plurality opinion) (appearing to pull back from a relaxing of standing
rules).
164. Christopher J. Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation of
Powers and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1645, 1647 (1992) (describing the parallel development of private standing
doctrines and enforcement of public-law rights).
165. Stewart, supra note 123, at 1682-83; see also Bressman, supra note 50, at 1661 (ex-
amining how judicial review can help create democratically reasonable regula-
tions, given the possibility that an "agency is susceptible to corrosive influences
when it refuses to act, just as when it decides to act," and that "these influences
may produce administrative decision making that is arbitrary from a democratic
perspective, no matter how rational or accountable it may be from a political
standpoint"). At least one scholar has called for the judicial branch to articulate a
constitutional model embracing cooperative federalism, a development that
would further unify these two mechanisms. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Stand-
ing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 663 (2004).
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have explored this perception of imbal-
ance, expanding and protecting state standing to challenge federal administra-
tive inaction-especially in the area of consumer protection, which has been
subject to unprecedented federal preemption and tort-reform challenges."' Al-
so, some state attorneys general have increased private enforcement in cases of
lax regulatory oversight'67 or expanded state consumer fraud statutes.' Taken
together, these developments signal a change in the nature of federal and state
roles in negotiating an increasingly blurred line between state tort law and fed-
eral regulation."9 Such a change provides an opportunity to revisit the basic
progressive tradition of consumer protection and the question of how best to
allocate enforcement powers.
Though distinct trends, the expansion of state enforcement powers and the
expansion of judicial review of agency failures to promulgate rules coincide.
The Supreme Court and Congress appear to be working in parallel and address-
ing similar federalism concerns in administrative law."o Enlarging the states'
role in the regime seems to be a common solution.
166. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 2027.
167. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
168. Klass, supra note 162, at 1521-25.
169. This change in defining traditional state tort law as federal regulatory law can be
seen through a line of pro-preemption Supreme Court cases. See Klass, supra note
27, at 1658-59; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An In-
stitutional Approach, 76 GEO, WASH. L. REV. 449, 459 (2oo8) ("The Court has os-
cillated between competing conceptions of tort as either primarily regulatory or
compensatory, with the regulatory view justifying preemptive results and the
compensatory view compelling the opposite.").
170. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The Framers adopted this constitutionally mandated balance of power, to re-
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front, because a federalist structure
of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages, such as a decen-
tralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heteroge-
neous society and increase(d] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes." (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) ("It is of considerable
relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was
in Lujan, a private individual."); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006) (respecting Congress's original cooperative federal-
ism regime for the Clean Water Act permitting process). But see Riegel v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that state common-law claims were
preempted under the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act). After the Court issued its pro-preemption ruling in Riegel, however,
Congress responded with a draft bill to overturn the ruling and restore state liabil-
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Some commentators point to the apparent ability of many interested par-
ties to bring lawsuits checking agency inactionY' State attorneys general do
bring consumer protection lawsuits under state laws that incorporate or other-
wise look similar to their federal counterparts. Sometimes state attorneys gener-
al have also been given investigatory or enforcement powers under federal
agency regulations.'"7 Recent scholarly work has examined state regulatory and
common-law innovation in the area of consumer protection, and at least one
scholar has argued that such innovation should count as a factor against agency
preemption.'73 However, a gap remains where a federal agency chooses not to
enforce its own regulations and the state is preempted from addressing the vi-
olation through its own laws.'74
A. Judicial Review ofAgency Inaction: Heckler v. Chaney
The Administrative Procedure Act provides judicial review of "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court."'75 Further, the
APA provides that a reviewing court must "hold unlawful and set aside" agency
action that is "not in accordance with law.""' But traditionally there is no judi-
cial remedy for agency inaction.'" According to the dominant account of ad-
ministrative law, the executive branch, not the judiciary, is responsible for re-
medying agency inaction.
171. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 125, at 282.
172. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., INTERIM BRIEFING PAPER, PREPARED FOR:
PRESIDENT-ELECT BARACK OBAMA TRANSITION TEAM 4 (2009), available at
http://www.naag.orglassets/files/pdf/policy/Transition Team-BriefingPaper 20
090no1.pdf ("For example, in the area of antitrust law, under the Clayton, Sher-
man and Hart-Scott-Rodino Acts, states may file suit in federal court for various
reasons and there is no preemption for states to file suit under state antitrust laws.
Similarly, the FTC's administrative rule in the enforcement of telemarketing al-
lows state Attorneys General to file suit in federal courts after FTC waiver of juris-
diction.").
173. Klass, supra note 27.
174. For examples of this loophole, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (2010), which examines areas where states are preempted
from acting and the relevant federal agency chooses not to act.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
176. Id. § 706(2)(A).
177. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on several
occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an
agency's absolute discretion.").
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The leading case discussing the limits of judicial review of agency inaction
is Heckler v. Chaney. 8 In Heckler, prisoners who had been sentenced to death
by lethal injection sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for failing to
approve the drugs as "safe and effective" for lethal injection. The Court consi-
dered whether such inaction was within the agency's prosecutorial discretion
and decided that there is a presumption against judicial review when an agency
chooses not to enforce. This presumption rests primarily on acknowledgment
of the "complicated balancing of a number of factors" including agency re-
sources, overall policies, whether enforcement will be successful, and the
Court's belief that inaction is less coercive than action.7
However, inaction can be coercive, as it was when the CPSC refused to
draft guidelines due to political forces attempting to undermine a bill passed by
Congress."'o A private-law remedy to address the CPSC's failure to draft appro-
priate guidelines and exemptions following the passage of the CPSIA would al-
low the states some power to hold the agency accountable to its mandate. But
allowing a state to determine how an agency should allot its resources, and dic-
tating fact-finding issues like determining guidelines runs afoul of exactly the
Court's concern in Heckler.
A failure to draft guidelines and create regulations differs from a failure to
enforce existing regulations. Congress delegates a check on this type of agency
inaction to the state attorneys general with its legislative expansion of enforce-
ment powers. For example, under the CPSIA, if the CPSC refused to enforce the
phthalate ban, the states would be able to do so using their enforcement power.
Thus, the "complicated balancing of factors"' that a court performs when de-
ciding whether to prosecute a particular violation would now be shared with
fifty state attorneys general. By expanding the state enforcement power, Con-
gress effectively addressed one of the main reasons given by the Court for not
reviewing agency decisions not to enforce-namely, that an agency should not
be forced to expend its limited resources on addressing any particular violation
178. Id.
179. Id. at 832.
180. See supra Section Tl.B; cf Cheh, supra note 129, at 265 ("There are many reasons
why an administrative agency might fail to act. The agency may simply be default-
ing in its obligations, it may lack the resources to do its job, it may be too cozy
with the would-be objects of its regulatory powers, or it may be dragging its feet
because of a change in the party controlling the presidency or a division between
Congress and the president over domestic policy.").
181. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 ("[Ain agency decision not to enforce often involves a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its ex-
pertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred,
but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether
the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action
requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency
has enough resources to undertake the action at all.").
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rather than another, while simultaneously ensuring that the public is protected.
The state enforcement power obviates this concern by leaving the agency's re-
sources untouched. A state attorney general who decides to sue for injunctive
relief for a violation of the CPSIA will have to use the state's resources.
B. The Court's Recent Opinions on State Access to Judicial Remedies and Fe-
deralism in Administrative Law: Massachusetts v. EPA and Cuomo v.
Clearinghouse Association
Judicially created private rights of action are another somewhat parallel so-
lution to the problem of agency inaction. The Supreme Court struggled with
the boundaries of this judicial remedy in its decision to grant state standing to
challenge the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse emissions in Massachusetts v.
EPA.
i. Massachusetts v. EPA
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued a decision that radically altered standing
doctrine: Massachusetts v. EPA." Finding that the states and cities bringing the
suit had standing to challenge the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, the Court went on to allude to an imbalance in administrative law."8 3
The Court also found that greenhouse gases from new vehicle emissions were
indeed covered under the Clean Air Act and that the EPA was required either to
regulate them or offer a reasonable argument for why it would not do so.*84
It is clear the Court expanded state standing to challenge agency inaction in
this case.' In affording a "special solicitude" to Massachusetts, the Court ac-
knowledged that the state had relinquished "certain sovereign prerogatives" to
the federal government." This transfer of power requires the federal govern-
182. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
183. Id. at 533-34 ("Although we have neither the expertise nor the authority to eva-
luate these policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing to do with whether
greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. Still less do they amount
to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment. In particu-
lar, while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does
not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws.").
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordi-
nary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1701, 1704-05 (2oo8); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State
Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN Sr. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2007).
186. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20; see also id. at 519 ("When a State enters the Un-
ion, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade
Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate
an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise
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ment to protect the states by regulating air pollutants that endanger the health
and welfare of the states' citizens. The absence of regulation at the federal level
creates a procedural right8 7 to challenge agency action as arbitrary and capri-
cious-a means of vindicating "Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-
sovereign interests."'
It is important for the state to be able to challenge the decisions of federal
agencies not to promulgate regulations, especially in the area of consumer pro-
tection. Scholars have argued that that right realizes public goods,'* promotes a
more balanced view of federalism,'9 o and checks excessive preemption. 9 ' Other
scholars have pointed out the connection between preemption and expanded
state standing, arguing that by aggressively preempting state common-law re-
medies as well as state statutes, the agencies themselves may have given rise to
the state's injury and therefore the ability of the state to challenge agency inac-
tion.'92 Whatever the precise benefits, expanded state standing is an important
response to the recent weakening of agencies as well as the federalization of
consumer protection.
of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-
empted.").
187. Cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) ("There is this
much truth to the assertion that 'procedural rights' are special: The person who
has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and imme-
diacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed con-
struction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agen-
cy's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot
establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld
or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years."). But
see Citizens Against Ruining the Env't v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2008)(finding that a state did not have standing to challenge agency inaction without
concrete injury).
188. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Ri-
co, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) ("[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and well being-both physical and economic--of its residents in general.").
189. Robert A. Weinstock, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public
Goods, 109 COLUm. L. REv. 798, 799-8oo (2009).
190. Stevenson, supra note 185, at 40-41 (describing the federalism effects of enlarged
state standing).
191. Cody, supra note 142, at 174-75.
192. Id.; cf Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131
(2009) (examining the rise and fall of standing doctrine relative to the birth of
public-interest ideological challenges to agency decisions, which exploded in the
1970s). But cf Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (signifying deep disagreements within the Court as to the role
and limits of standing).
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It is also noteworthy that the Court chose to focus on a state's standing to
challenge an agency's decision not to regulate rather than more traditional ad-
ministrative law doctrines such as the level of deference to afford such a deci-
sion.'91 The Court underscored exactly the types of federalism concerns raised
by agency inaction-in particular, the inadequacy of federal oversight of federal
agencies-rather than avoiding the federalism concern and instead focusing on
a more administrative-oriented correction through greater scrutiny of agency
action.194 This language in the opinion connects the Court and Congress in their
attempt to find a federalism balance in administrative law, and reflects the un-
cooperative federalism impulse specifically.'95
However, Massachusetts v. EPA is only one recent case, and it is unclear
how any new standing rule will be applied in the future.'96 The particular inac-
tion at issue-the refusal to regulate greenhouse gases based on the agency's de-
termination that the Clean Air Act did not cover such emissions-falls under
the area of limited judicial review of agency inaction.'97 But even Massachusetts
v. EPA's expanded standing doctrine would probably not cover an agency's de-
cision not to enforce its regulations.
The CPSIA could be seen as a congressional attempt to expand on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA by giving state attorneys general
a special power to enforce federal regulations. If administrative law is the new
federalism, expanding state enforcement mechanisms is as important to instil-
ling a federal-state balance as limiting preemption of state law and expanding
private rights of action. These three reforms should not be understood as mu-
tually exclusive; rather, they form a web of consumer protection, each respond-
ing to slightly different forms of agency inaction.
193. Metzger, supra note 3, at 2062-63. But see id. at 2064 (pointing out that the Court
possibly applied a heightened scrutiny in its Chevron analysis of the agency's deci-
sion).
194. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 1749, 1803 (2007) (discussing the Court's unwillingness to accept the
executive policy reasons not to regulate in Massachusetts v. EPA).
195. Cf Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 22, at 54.
196. Compare Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 344 (2d Cir. 2009)
(finding standing for states to bring nuisance claims with respect to climate
change), with California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. Co6-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL
2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (rejecting special standing for a state to bring a
public nuisance claim).
197. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007) (explaining that an agency deci-
sion not to promulgate regulations differs from a decision not to enforce viola-
tions, which is subject to very limited judicial review).
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2. Cuomo v. Clearing House Association
The Court's recent decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n'9' also ex-
presses concerns about administrative federalism and the sense that agency
preemption may have gone too far. In Clearing House, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) claimed that New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo did not have visitorial powers'99 to investigate alleged viola-
tions of New York State's fair lending laws by national banks."oo The Court,
while agreeing that the National Banking Act delegates visitorial powers to the
federal government alone, invoked federalism principles to distinguish a state's
exercise of its sovereign ability to enforce its own state laws from an exercise of
visitorial powers. 20' The decision focused on the seeming inequity that results
from allowing states to retain their state laws while curtailing the means to en-
force those laws; as the Court put it, "The bark remains, but the bite does
not."202
The Court also signaled a desire to rein in aggressive agency preemption
and emphasized the important balance between federal administrative control
and continued state enforcement of state substantive law.20 3 While Clearing
House addressed the preemption of state law rather than a state's ability to en-
force federal regulations, the two issues are interwoven through a larger federal-
ism framework.20 4 In particular, both issues highlight the importance of allow-
ing innovative state responses to federal regulatory lapses.0 '
198. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
199. Visitorial powers allow inspection of a bank and its records. 12 C.F.R. §
7.4000(a)(2) (2005) ("For purposes of this section, visitorial powers include: (i)
Examination of a bank; (ii) Inspection of a bank's books and records; (iii) Regula-
tion and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal
banking law; and (iv) Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state
laws concerning those activities.").
200. Clearing House, 129 S. Ct. at 2734.
201. Id. at 2717-20.
202. Id. at 2718.
203. Id. ("Channeling state attorneys general into judicial law-enforcement proceed-
ings (rather than allowing them to exercise 'visitorial' oversight) would preserve a
regime of exclusive administrative oversight by the Comptroller while honoring
in fact rather than merely in theory Congress's decision not to pre-empt substan-
tive state law. This system echoes many other mixed state/federal regimes in
which the Federal Government exercises general oversight while leaving state
substantive law in place." (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)).
204. Cf Metzger, supra note 3, at 2030-39 (describing recent Supreme Court opinions
addressing administrative law issues through a federalism lens).
205. Cf David Streitfeld & John Collins Rudolph, States Are Pondering Fraud Suits
Against Banks, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2009, at Bi ("'For the better part of eight years,
the federal regulators were not being aggressive, and at the same time we were dis-
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C. How the State Enforcement Power Differs from the Court's Approach
The CPSIA authorizes state attorneys general to initiate the same enforce-
ment actions as federal agencies.20 6 This public-law enforcement mechanism
differs from the expanded private right of states to protect their citizens. Most
importantly, a state enforcement power allows for oversight of those areas
where an agency chooses not to prosecute a violation-not just those areas of
inaction currently subject to judicial review. If the goal is to increase oversight
of agency inaction and encourage agencies to enforce their regulations consis-
tently, a co-enforcement model might have advantages over expanded state
standing to challenge agency inaction.
Unlike expanded judicial review of agency inaction, the state enforcement
power does not implicate separation-of-powers concerns. In exercising that
power, a state does not ask a court to review an agency's decision not to enforce
its regulations; rather, the state enforces the regulations for itself. This arrange-
ment addresses many of the Court's concerns in Heckler v. Chaney, as well as
those of the dissenters in Massachusetts v. EPA.2 07
The Court's recent decisions regarding state standing and regulatory
preemption are important components of a larger trend toward restoring the
federalism balance in administrative law. But these decisions do not obviate the
need for a state enforcement power. Such powers offer a remedy in an area that
is immune to judicial review even under a liberalized state standing doctrine:
agency discretion not to prosecute a particular violation.
abled,' said the Ohio Attorney General, Richard Cordray. 'There was nothing
holding back irrational and irresponsible practices."'). And less than one month
after the Court's ruling in Clearing House, Illinois Attorney General Madigan filed
suit alleging violations of state laws. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Re-
lief, People v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. o9CH26434 (Ill. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2009),
available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressrooml2009o7/WELLS%
2oFARGO%2oCOMPLAINT_07-31-2oo913-44-30.pdf.
206. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008,15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (Supp. II
2009) ("State Attorney General Enforcement-(i)Right of Action-Except as
provided in paragraph (5), the attorney general of a State, or other authorized
State officer, alleging a violation of 19(a)(1),(2),(5),(6),(7),(9), or (12) of this Act
that affects or may affect such State or its residents may bring an action on behalf
of the residents of the State in any United States district court for the district in
which the defendant is found or transacts business to obtain appropriate injunc-
tive relief.").
207. Both the Heckler v. Chaney and Massachusetts v. EPA dissenters expressed concern
that a state or citizen should not be able to force the executive branch to act. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 549-51 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
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V. OTHER LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS OF EXPANDED ENFORCEMENT POWER
A. Past Use of State Enforcement Powers
Congress has granted state enforcement powers since the mid-1970s, with a
burst of such grants in the 1990s and again in recent years. For example, the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 authorized states to bring actions for monetary
damages for violations of the Sherman Act,20s and some environmental laws al-
lowed for state enforcement of certain aspects of those laws.o 9
Other statutes, such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996210 and the Me-
dicaid Act... are often cited as incorporating many of the ideals of cooperative
federalism, yet do not contain explicit grants of state enforcement power. In
many of these earlier statutes, the federal and state roles are complex and inter-
woven; there is no clear delegation of state enforcement power as seen in the
CPSIA. State enforcement powers were part of larger state regulatory duties and
sometimes the enforcement power was only implied or cabined to specific state
programs under federal law."' This differs from the CPSIA and other recent
regulatory overhauls that leave most of the regulating under the federal agency's
purview yet allow for co-enforcement of the federal law. 13
208. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c
(2oo6).
209. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (authorizing states to administer and enforce
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program); Clean Air
Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (authorizing each state to create a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that
guides the state's enforcement of the federal law).
210. Pub. L. No. 104-104, no Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.); see P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd., 189 F-3 d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)
("The [Telecom] Act exemplifies a cooperative federalism system, in which state
commissions can exercise their expertise about the needs of the local market and
local consumers, but are guided by the provisions of the Act and by the concomi-
tant FCC regulations."). But see Weiser, supra note 138, at 730-31 (discussing the
cooperative federalism elements in the Telecommunications Act but noting the
reluctance of federal courts to permit a greater role for states).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(1o)(A) (2006).
212. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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B. Congress Returns to State Enforcement Powers
Congress considered the state enforcement power in recent high-profile
consumer protection bills besides the CPSIA. 14 Unlike the previous incarna-
tions of cooperative federalism regimes, the new crop of state enforcement
powers tends to represent isolated areas of state authority within a predomi-
nantly federal regulatory structure. Given the states' traditional jurisdiction
over health and welfare and the history of consumer protection actions by state
attorneys general, these recent legislative proposals have the "uncooperative fe-
deralism" effect of increasing the tension between states and federal agencies
and thereby strongly discouraging political or otherwise arbitrary agency inac-
tion.
Like the consumer protection failures of the last decade, the recent financial
crisis spurred an extensive regulatory overhaul of the financial sector. Repre-
sentative Barney Frank, the Democratic Chairman of the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee, introduced legislation that reforms many consumer protec-
tion areas in the financial sector.2"' Testimony directed toward rectifying
particular financial agency abuses, such as nonenforcement, focused on ex-
panding state enforcement powers and limiting preemption of state law."16 The
final bill embraced state enforcement powers"'
C. The Web Approach
A state enforcement power is sometimes created in exchange for the abso-
lute preemption of state laws, as in the proposed Data Accountability and Trust
Act of 2oo9,"2 and the Fair Credit and Reporting Act of 2003."9 Such compro-
mises have become more common, perhaps as preemption has become more of
214. State enforcement powers were introduced in early versions of climate change leg-
islation. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2oo9, H.R. 2454, noth
Cong. (2009); cf American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 17938-40 (West 2oo) (expressly authorizing state attorneys general to enforce
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) through civil
enforcement actions).
215. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. iu-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2oo) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
216. See, e.g., The Proposed Consumer Protection Financial Agency: Implications for Con-
sumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, ith
Cong. (2009) (statement of Prentiss Cox, Associate Professor, University of Min-
nesota Law School).
217. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1042.
218. See H.R. 2221, 1ith Cong. §§ 4(c), 6 (2009).
219. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(s)(c), 1681(t) (20o6).
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a political tool.22 o However, by preempting state experimentation with stricter
legislation, Congress forgoes a celebrated benefit of federalism: states' acting as
innovative laboratories. The CPSIA, by contrast, addresses consumer protection
through a web of accountability- and federalism-promoting mechanisms."'
Do the CPSIA and the Wall Street Reform Act signal a new congressional
approach to administrative law? Both of these overhauls were prompted by un-
derenforcement. Both strengthen consumer protection by expanding the state
enforcement power, seemingly echoing the Court's expressions of expanded
avenues of judicial review of some types of agency inaction." Unlike previous
legislation, however, the CPSIA did not expand the state enforcement power
220. The first generations of state enforcement grants were much less likely to contain
strong preemption language. In fact, many of them contained express saving
clauses making clear that the new legislation in no way limited state law. See, e.g.,
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (20o6). While
some of the newer legislation incorporating these grants also incorporate saving
clauses, preemption language has been more common in the last ten years. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 168i(s)(c), 1681(t); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2oo9,
S. 1490, imth Cong. §§ 318-19 (2009); H.R. 2221 §§ 4(c), 6 (2009).
221. The Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2oo8, S. 2831, noth Cong.
(2008), would have also granted state enforcement powers while allowing for
more stringent state law. So, too, would recent amendments to HIPPA passed in
the economic stimulus bill incorporate this new "web" of consumer protection.
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. § 132od-5(d)
(West 2oo) (expressly authorizing state attorneys general to enforce HIPAA
through civil enforcement actions).
222. Other recent legislation attempts to revitalize the use of citizen suits, presumably
as a similar check on agency inaction. Citizen suit provisions were originally pro-
posed in recent legislation addressing climate change, see American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, inth Cong. (2009), as well as in recent at-
tempts to overhaul the existing food safety regime and the FDA, see, e.g., Food
Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875, nith Cong. (2009). Citizen suits, im-
portant components of a legislative web of consumer protection tools, raise their
own constitutional and doctrinal questions, which are outside the scope of this
Article. See Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 166 (1992) (arguing that there is not a consti-
tutional issue with such citizen suit grants). Compare Myriam E. Gilles, Represen-
tational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89
CALIF. L. REv. 315, 365-67 (2001) (arguing that some Article II problems could be
overcome with the right legislative grants of executive oversight over citizen suits),
with Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environ-
mental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 383 (2001) (noting possible Article II im-
plications of such citizen suits). Empirical studies have shown that citizen suits in
the environmental arena both encourage and aid governmental enforcement as
well as private compliance. See, e.g., Kristi M. Smith, Who's Suing Whom?: A
Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions
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while simultaneously strengthening preemption, or as part of a larger state im-
plementation program. Instead, the state enforcement power in the CPSIA is a
distinct power, allowing for a particular "uncooperative" role for the states.1 3
Through their enforcement powers, the states are encouraged to monitor agen-
cy inaction, serving as a check against political or otherwise arbitrary nonen-
forcement. The "uncooperative federalism" model is uniquely suited to rectify
recent abuses of agency authority and general agency weakening. Unlike earlier
conceptions of cooperative federalism, this newer model is instead born from
the tension-creating mechanisms of concurrent enforcement powers.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF STATE ENFORCEMENT IN RESPONSE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
INACTION
A. Criticisms
The greatest objections to judicial review of agency inaction are rooted in
theories of prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers.2 4 According to
the Court in Heckler v. Chaney, prosecutorial discretion relies on "a compli-
cated balance of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise ...
(includingi whether a violation has occurred,... [and] whether the particular
enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies.""' Despite
these factors, however, the Court acknowledges that Congress has the power to
limit agencies' prosecutorial discretion."'
Although there has been very little scholarly discussion of concurrent state
enforcement of federal law, there has been some discussion of state attorneys
general "regulating through litigation.""' In those cases, the focus of the criti-
cism is on the use of the state to change federal law through coordinated multis-
223. See supra Section V.B.
224. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
225. Id. at 831.
226. Id. at 833 ("Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it
wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an
agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.").
227. Donald Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens
Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2008) (explaining this common ra-
tionale against state attorneys general bringing tort claims in areas also regulated
by federal agencies); see also Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Accountability State
Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REv.
885 (2007) (arguing that state attorneys general multistate actions in effect un-
dermine principles of federalism). But see Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of
Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 1998 (2001) (arguing that multistate actions by state attorneys general do
not implicate separation-of-powers and federalism concerns).
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tate actions using parens patriae authority." While such actions are discussed
briefly in Section II.B of this Article, they are completely different from a con-
gressionally delegated'power to enforce existing federal regulations and laws.
Such powers instead supplement executive enforcement. Although one
could theoretically imagine an instance in which dual enforcement strategies
could vary,2 9 the fact that Congress has legislated for such a regime, and retains
the right to revoke state enforcement powers, renders arguments about state
encroachment on executive prosecutorial discretion moot to this particular in-
stance of enforcement by state attorneys general.230
Some scholars, adopting a unitary executive theory, might argue that Con-
gress may not delegate federal executive functions to the states."' The unitary
executive theory states, in essence, that the president retains complete control
over the bureaucracy. 32 There is only one case of such a theory being consi-
dered as a possible basis for precluding state enforcement of federal law, and in
that case the delegation of enforcement power to the states was upheld.33
228. Black's Law Dictionary describes parens patriae as "a concept of standing utilized
to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of
the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state." BLAcic's LAw
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
229. See Lynch, supra note 227, at 2014-15 (2001) (describing this exact scenario with
the consolidation of the state and federal enforcement suits of antitrust provisions
against Microsoft).
230. Id. at 2015 ("While dual enforcement of some federal laws by the state and federal
governments may be inefficient, the fact that Congress chose to establish such a
regime and retains the power to end it undermines the argument that states are
usurping federal power.").
231. Id. at 2029 (exploring the possibility of an argument against state enforcement of
federal law from those who espouse the unitary executive theory).
232. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Enforce
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570 (1994) (laying out the case for the unitary execu-
tive theory); Sanford Levinson & Jack Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dan-
gers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1842 (2010) ("[T]he unitary executive
theory arose during a period when the President and Congress were usually con-
trolled by opposite parties: defenders of a strong presidency viewed increased con-
trol over the bureaucracy as the best way to promote their policy goals without in-
terference from opponents of the President.").
233. Lynch, supra note 227, at 2032 (citing Tennessee v. Highland Mem'1 Cemetery,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 65, 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 411 (1999) (Thomas, I., dissenting) ("I do not know of a principle of
federal law that prohibits the States from interpreting and applying federal law.
Indeed, basic principles of federalism compel us to presume that States are com-
petent to do so.")). For more on the limits of unitary executive theory, see Ca-
minker, supra note 14; and Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). See also The Supreme Court, 2oo6
Term, Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 335> 421
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State enforcement powers also do not implicate separation-of-powers con-
cerns. For example, in the CPSIA, Congress created numerous controls over the
state enforcement power, requiring the state to notify the agency of the planned
litigation (except in the case of a "substantial product hazard"), and allowing
the agency to intervene in any state enforcement action.3 4 This may serve as
enough executive oversight to allay any fears of an improper delegation."' The
state is also subject to its own political and budgetary limits on enforcement."36
This is not to say that such powers are not politically controversial; in fact they
absolutely are.237 It is the tension-creating and accountability-forcing potential
(2007) ("But despite the general acceptance of presidential control theory and its
corollary of judicial deference, in recent years the Supreme Court has looked with
suspicion on politically motivated administration, and it has taken a few unmis-
takable steps that signal executive authority is not unbounded and will be held ex-
ternally accountable.").
234. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2oo8, 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (Supp. II
2009); see also Lynch, supra note 227, at 2015 n.89 ("Note that the same statutory
and case law binding federal enforcement authorities would still bind the states.
The divergence would be in how each enforcement actor-state or federal-
chooses to exercise its significant discretion in starting investigations and filing ac-
tions in court.").
235. Cf Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 232, at 639 ("[I1f one accepts the proposition
that the President is the only individual constitutionally granted the executive
power and that this authority includes the ability to direct the execution of federal
law, then ... the President could direct state officers in their execution of federal
law .. .. ").
236. See Lynch, supra note 227, at 2031 ("Justice Scalia himself suggested that voluntary
enforcement by the states of federal law could be an exception to unitarian doc-
trine: 'The dissent is correct that control by the unitary Federal Executive is also
sacrificed when States voluntarily administer federal programs, but the condition
of voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use
this device as a means of reducing the power of the Presidency."' (quoting Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 f.12 (1997)).
237. The introduction of an amendment that would remove the state enforcement
grant in the Wall Street Reform Act by Senator Thomas Carper set off a flurry of
political debate between industry and consumer advocates. See, e.g., Letter from
Ams. for Fin. Reform to the U.S. Senate, Oppose Carper #3949 Giving National
Banks Immunity from Compliance with Federal and State Consumer Protection
Laws (May 12, 2010), available at http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2oo/o5/oppose-
carper-3949-giving-national-banks-immunity-from-compliance-with-federal-
and-state-consumer-protection-laws/; Editorial, U.S., Not States, Should Have
Lead Role In Consumer Financial Protection, WASH. POST, May 18, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/contentarticlet2olotosfi7AR20loo51703
456.html (arguing for the amendment); Patricia Zengerie, White House Touts
States' Role in Bank Overhaul, REUTERS, May 13, 2010, http://www.reuters.coml
article/idUSTRE64C5OU2oloo513.
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of such powers that drives political rhetoric, however, not legal doctrine. "'
With the CPSIA, Congress has made clear its decision to sanction violators, and
increasing the likelihood of enforcement is a necessary means of ensuring in-
dustry compliance with regulations.2 9
Another criticism of concurrent enforcement powers focuses on the politi-
cal incentives and motivations of state attorneys general. o Attorneys general
often run for higher office, and certain high-profile actions can enhance their
political standing.4'
However, one need not see state attorneys general as apolitical in order to
champion concurrent state enforcement; one need only assume that different
political incentives apply to the federal and state governments and that concur-
rent enforcement thus ensures enforcement even when the regulated industry
may strongly lobby against it."' Moreover, the political ambitions of many state
attorneys general may in fact encourage them to challenge a status-quo agency
that is under-enforcing. 4' Thus, the political motivations of the attorneys gen-
eral may offset those of the federal agencies.
Some commentators cite the relationship between state attorneys general
and private counsel as a reason to scale back the states' authority.4" Such critics
charge that the use of outside counsel in state enforcement actions enriches
those private attorneys, compromising the public-interest nature of the en-
forcement actions. Such criticisms tend to focus on public nuisance cases, such
238. For an example of opposition to legislative grants of state enforcement powers, see
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Plaintiffs Bar's Covert Effort To
Expand State Attorney General Federal Enforcement Power, WASH. LEGAL FOUND,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, July 1o, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.wlf.org/
Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounderlo7loogSchwartzLB.pdf.
239. Cf Hodas, supra note 9, at 1604 ("Effective enforcement is based on the theory of
deterrence, which holds that a strong enforcement program deters the regulated
community from violating in the first place.").
240. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 227, at 967 (discussing the relationship between state
attorneys general and the plaintiffs' bar); see also Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-
Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 877, 883 (2003) (de-
scribing rent-seeking actions by states in the Microsoft antitrust litigation).
241. Meyer, supra note 227, at 895 ("Assuming that the attorney general is a self-
interested politician seeking to maintain or advance his political career, the attor-
ney general has an incentive to drive policy change.").
242. Cf Hills, supra note 117, at 23 ("The point is not that state politicians are somehow
immune to 'capture' by regulated interests. The point is that they are captured by
a different set of interests than those dominant in Washington, D.C., because state
constituencies contain a different mix of interests than the nation as a whole.").
243. Id. at 22-23 (arguing that state politicians are "sufficiently ambitious for higher
office that they will undertake the risks of enacting new policies rather than wait
for some other politician to take the initiative").
244. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 227, at 920.
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as the highly publicized actions by attorneys general against tobacco advertising
and lead paint pollution. 4 5 Attorneys general explain that these arrangements
with private counsel are necessary given limited public funding and re-
sources.24 6 However, in the CPSIA, Congress acknowledged this relationship
and prescribed guidelines for arrangements between state attorneys general and
private counsel, including specifying that any information learned while assist-
ing the state could not be shared with counsel in other private civil actions aris-
ing out of the same facts. 47
B. Benefits
The benefits of state enforcement powers include a greater balance among
the three branches of the federal government, with Congress reasserting some
control over agencies recently controlled by a captured executive branch, as well
as a greater balance-and a productive tension-between the federal and state
governments. State enforcement powers create little risk of judicial overreach-
ing. In reviewing an enforcement action under a state enforcement power, a
court need not compel an agency to prioritize a particular violation over others.
The dynamic between federal agencies and the states is slightly less antagonistic
than it would be if a state were directly challenging an agency's lack of enforce-
ment through administrative law doctrines, yet the states' enforcement power
still holds the agencies accountable for enforcing violations of their regulations.
The enhanced accountability comes from increased public awareness of an
agency's underenforcement through state enforcement and subsequent media
coverage. In this way, the use of a state enforcement power can begin to change
traditional understandings of political accountability mechanisms, increasing
awareness of underenforcement and providing political pressure to enforce,
245. Id. at 920-21.
246. See, e.g., EMILY GOTTLIEB & AMY WIDMAN, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY,
STATE ATTORNEYs GENERAL: THE PEOPLE'S CHAMPION 2 (2008), available at
http://www.centerjd.org/archives/studies/AGWhitePaperF.pdf ("As West Virgin-
ia's Chief Deputy Attorney General Fran Hughes put it, with contingency ar-
rangements, 'the attorney general retains control of the case, all the documents
are available under the state Freedom of Information Act, and taxpayers end up
better off because the legal fees 'are paid by the companies that break the law."');
see also Marc Dann, Att'y Gen. of Ohio, Address to the City Club of Cleveland 5
(June 29, 2007), available at http://www.legalnewsline.com/content/img/ft97459/
dannspeech.pdf ("(Industry groupsi know that public officials don't have the re-
sources to finance complicated law suits that often take years to work their way
through the courts.... If these groups get their way, attorneys general around the
country will be disarmed.").
247. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 20 73(b)(6)
(Supp. II 2009).
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while also increasing the number of enforcement actions in a political environ-
ment where the executive branch may be averse to more regulation.248
Giving states enforcement power encourages more information gathering,
compensates for limited agency budgets, and creates a necessary tension be-
tween the states and the federal government to ultimately encourage robust en-
forcement of federal law.4 Political and funding considerations are relevant to
deciding which cases to prosecute, and not all states will be able to take advan-
tage of state enforcement provisions; nor will states always need to, especially
when they have parallel laws. Nevertheless, an expanded state enforcement
power holds the promise of addressing a particular type of agency inaction: un-
derenforcement of regulations whose purpose is to maximize intangible yet ne-
cessary goods, like health and safety, environmental protection, food and drug
safety, or economic stability."o Enhanced state enforcement powers can address
the arbitrariness of recent agency inaction,"' the lack of judicial review of such
inaction, and the preemption of state remedies.
CONcLUsION
The CPSC case study highlights the problem of agency underenforce-
ment-in this case, the product of a captured executive branch coupled with
limited judicial review of agency inaction. Under-enforcement has distorted the
federal-state balance previously achieved in administrative law through rule-
248. Cf Gifford, supra note 227, at 947 ("The recent regulatory climate, at least at the
federal level, has been more pro-business and antiregulatory than at any time in
recent memory. The judicial branch appears, to many of those committed to ad-
dressing public health problems, to be the last hope for what they perceive to be
sound environmental and product regulation.").
249. See Weinstock, supra note 189, at 836 ("States, as social aggregates, experience the
proper incentives to watchdog the provision of public goods by the federal gov-
ernment."); see also Meyer, supra note 227, at 908 ("The Istates attorneys gener-
al's] ability to use litigation to regulate industries can also spur federal action. To
illustrate, following both the [states attorneys general's) success against the tobac-
co companies in the 1990s and Eliot Spitzer's success against Wall Street in the
wake of the Enron scandal, federal agencies responded by upping their enforce-
ment efforts."); cf Sunstein, supra note 130, at 656 (arguing that the availability of
judicial review changes behavior).
250. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 59, 66 (2010) (discussing how agencies can best manage these types of "mas-
sive problems" and encouraging cooperative regimes between agencies and locali-
ties).
251. See Bressman, supra note 5o, at 1659-61 (arguing that arbitrariness is an important
problem to address and that the Court's doctrines of standing and nonreviewa-
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making procedures meant to increase transparency and greater review of agency
actions. Regulatory underenforcement and preemption of state laws have hig-
hlighted the federalism imbalance.
One underutilized and underanalyzed way to combat such imbalance is to
empower states to enforce agency regulations. Congress is experimenting once
again with this tool. Indeed, there may be a renewed appreciation of the value of
concurrent state and federal regulatory enforcement and the tension it creates
between states and federal agencies. The state enforcement power can improve
the legitimacy of the regulatory system. And the political effects of enhanced en-
forcement powers can hold agencies more accountable for promoting the pub-
lic interest through robust enforcement, especially in areas in which the agen-
cies might be vulnerable to capture.
There is a risk that an expanded state enforcement power will be purchased
at the price of more aggressive agency preemption and more limited citizen
suits and other private rights of action. Thus, an expanded state enforcement
power should be part of a larger web of protections. It is not enough to merely
empower the states to enforce federal regulations; rather, state enforcement
powers must always exist alongside more traditional forms of state innovation
in the areas of health and safety. And federal enforcement must operate as a
floor below the state enforcement power. Combining the state enforcement
power with more limited preemption of state innovation will allow the federal-
ism balance to be restored.
The states' ability to enforce federal regulations, particularly when an agen-
cy has chosen not to act, is one important aspect of a robust federal-state en-
forcement system. While congressional grants of enforcement powers to the
states are not necessarily new, understanding their importance to ongoing fede-
ralism and administrative law debates, and encouraging their future use, is cen-
tral to strengthening consumer protection.
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